Deadweight Costs and the Size of Government*

By G. Becker, Casey B. Mulligan. Journal law and economy, 2003

245 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/fad096d7176bef79bc33f188bffc604df6b51fe0

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In Economics and Econometrics

Citations in the corpus

Tax Bases, Tax Rates and the Elasticity of Reported Income (2005, background): “To appreciate possible implications, observe that in the presence of such effects, supporters of a small government may have an incentive to pursue policies that make the tax system less efficient (and vice versa; Becker and Mulligan, 1998, make this point explicitly).”
EZ-Tax: Tax Salience and Tax Rates (2009, unknown): “These members of the Panel envisioned that voters would appropriately control growth in the size of the federal government through the electoral process.”
The taxman tools up: An event history study of the introduction of the personal income tax (2009, methodology): “This includes among others Peltzman (1980), Reizman and Slemrod (1987), Kau and Rubin (1987), Husted and Kenny (1997), Rodrik (1998), Boix (2001), Becker and Mulligan (2003), Persson and Tabellini (2003), Kenny and Winer (2006) and Dusek (2006).”
Why Not a Political Coase Theorem? Social Conflict, Commitment and Politics (2002, unknown): “Rodrik (1986), Wilson (1991) and Becker and Mulligan (1998) argue that if the amount of redistribution is endogenous, then politicians might want to commit to using inefficient methods in order to reduce total redistribution.”
A glimpse through the veil of ignorance: equality of opportunity and support for redistribution (2010, result): “These findings are consistent with theoretical predictions that an increase in deadweight loss leads to a smaller government (see Becker and Mulligan, 2003; and Crutzen and Sahuguet, 2007).”
Tax structure, size of government, and the extension of the voting franchise in Western Europe, 1860–1938 (2009, methodology): “Peltzman (1980), Riezman and Slemrod (1987), Becker and Mulligan (2003), and Kenny and Winer (2006) also stress the role of relative tax collection costs as determinants of the size of government and the tax structure.”
Tax Systems in the World: An Empirical Investigation into the Importance of Tax Bases, Administration Costs, Scale and Political Regime (2006, methodology): “In a general setting, increased reliance on existing bases may be accompanied by taxation of previously untaxed bases for which administration is relatively costly (Becker and Mulligan, 2003, Hettich and Winer, 1988, 1999).”
Testing the Mill hypothesis of fiscal illusion (2005, background): “In fact, various explanations which do not refer to fiscal illusion, but are based on the assumption that all agents are rational have been suggested to account for this phenomenon (e.g., Becker and Mulligan, 1998 ).”