Why Not a Political Coase Theorem? Social Conflict, Commitment and Politics

By Daron Acemoglu. 2002

802 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/7577e6be8d1b7efa304fcf0e315a411f7e10e62a

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Citations in the corpus

Kleptocracy and Divide-and-Rule: A Model of Personal Rule (2004, neutral): “…McGuire and Olson, 1996, Robinson, 1998, Wintrobe, 1998, Acemoglu and Robinson, 2000b, La Ferrara and Bates, 2001, Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003, Acemoglu, 2003).8 However, these models do not capture the notion that the nature of politics under weak institutions is different than in…”
State-owned MNCs and host country expropriation risk: The role of home state soft power and economic gunboat diplomacy (2014, background): “…vulnerability of foreign MNCs stems not only from the incomplete nature of the contract that cannot anticipate all future contingencies (Bull, 1987; Levin, 2003), but also the fact that the state holds the final arbitration power on contracts (North, 1981; Acemoglu, 2003; Acemoglu & Johnson, 2005).”
Inequality, Democracy, and Institutions: A Critical Review of Recent Research (2010, neutral): “As explained in Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001), the interest of the colonial administrators—who were often relying on indigenous intermediaries—and post-colonial power was often predatory in many countries. In the same fashion, Morrison (2006) gives a detailed account of three African countr”
Relational Incentive Contracts (2003, positive): “Acemoglu (2003), for example, develops incentive compatibility conditions similar to those used here in analysing taxation under dictatorship and democracy.”
Institutions matter, but which ones? (2005, positive): “For a theoretical model of this, see Acemoglu (2003). 20 In a widely noted book Parente and Prescott (2000) have identified the main reason for low total factor productivity in developing countries as the barriers imposed by their governments to adopting internationally available technology and the ”
Institutions as a Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth (2005, background): “…that protects the property rights of a small elite might not be inimical to economic growth when all major investment opportunities are in the hands of this elite, but could be very harmful when investments and participation by other groups are important for economic growth [see Acemoglu (2003b)l.”
Resource curse: An analysis of causes, experiences and possible ways forward (2007, background): “Along similar lines, Acemoglu (2003) has sought to understand why the lack of social cohesion perpetuates poor institutions.”
ALFRED MARSHALL LECTURE SHAREHOLDER PROTECTION, STOCK MARKET DEVELOPMENT, AND POLITICS (2006, background): “To the extent that these correlations capture causal relationships from regulation to financial development and economic growth, one may ask why any legislator would want to grant less than a maximum degree of protection to non-controlling shareholders: the observed variation across countries and ov”
Politicians, Taxes, and Debt (2010, neutral): “For a discussion of the self-interested behaviour of politicians and the implications for corruption and public goods provision, see Acemoglu (2003), Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2004), Acemoglu and Verdier (2000), Banerjee (1997), Buchanan and Tullock (1962), North (1981), Persson and Tabellini…”
Institutions and Economic Growth in Historical Perspective (2014, background): “…economy better off are often blocked by the fact that it is difficult for the potential gainers from institutional reform to commit themselves to reimburse the losers after the latter have lost their institutional powers (Acemoglu, 2003;Acemoglu et al. 2005, p. 436; Ogilvie, 2007, pp. 666–7).”