Tax Systems in the World: An Empirical Investigation into the Importance of Tax Bases, Administration Costs, Scale and Political Regime
222 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/7dfd559f009df9c7dfbecb5e7f53efff3ad7d9d1
How researchers see this paper
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In Accounting
- H. Kleven
- C. Kreiner
- Emmanuel Saez
- Mihir A. Desai
- James R. Hines
- C. Fritz Foley
- J. Freitas
- Peter Sandholt Jensen
In Economics and Econometrics
- H. Kleven
- C. Kreiner
- Emmanuel Saez
- Mihir A. Desai
- Peter Sandholt Jensen
- James R. Hines
- C. Fritz Foley
- Toke S. Aidt
Citations in the corpus
- Why Can Modern Governments Tax so Much? An Agency Model of Firms as Fiscal Intermediaries (2016, background): “In addition to these hypotheses, a number of studies have pointed out that there are fiscal capacity constraints to government growth (e.g., Kau and Rubin, 1981; Bird, 1989, 1992; Peltzman, 1980; Riezman and Slemrod, 1987; Kenny and Winer, 2006; Aidt and Jensen, 2009).”
- The Demand for Tax Haven Operations (2006, background): “are the subject of a growing empirical literature (e.g. Slemrod, 2004; Kenny and Winer, 2006; Hines, 2007).”
- Inequality, the politics of redistribution and the tax mix (2012, background): “4.2 Preferences over tax schedules (t, τ) The empirical work of Kenny and Winer (2006) points out the importance of the tax base determining the resulting tax-mix.”
- The taxman tools up: An event history study of the introduction of the personal income tax (2009, background): “…example, a tari¤ can be collected at ports by a small number of educated civil servants, income taxes require the participation of a large number of educated people, who can ll in complex tax returns, and require a large bureaucracy to administer (Riezman and Slemrod, 1987; Kenny and Winer, 2006).”
- Tax structure, size of government, and the extension of the voting franchise in Western Europe, 1860–1938 (2009, methodology): “Kenny and Winer (2006) report that falling relative tax collection costs, measured by average years of schooling, explain why some countries raise a larger share of taxes through individual income and goods & service taxes than others during the period 1975-92, while Riezman and Slemrod (1987) show…”