Why Do Entrepreneurs Enter Politics? Evidence from China

By Hongbin Li, Lingsheng Meng, Junsen Zhang. 2006

434 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Information Systems, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/f99968fe2d905719ec132e3760581ee75b06685c

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

In Information Systems

In Strategy and Management

Citations in the corpus

Political connections and corporate diversification in emerging economies: Evidence from China (2012, methodology): “Probably the most relevant of all institutions, as they pertain to the value of political connections in firm growth, are free market mechanisms and intermediate institutions (Gao, Murray, Kotabe, & Lu, 2010; Li, Meng, & Zhang, 2006; Wan & Hoskisson, 2003).”
State Ownership and Firm Innovation in China: An Integrated View of Institutional and Efficiency Logics (2017, background): “Previous studies in economics, finance, and international business have used it extensively to measure institutional development in different regions in China (e.g., Li, Meng, and Zhang, 2006; Gao et al., 2010).”
Principal‐principal conflicts under weak institutions: A study of corporate takeovers in China (2013, methodology): “Like previous research on the political connections of Chinese listed firms (Fan et al ., 2007; Li, Meng, and Zhang, 2006; Li et al ., 2008), we used the CEO’s affiliation with the local government as an indication of political connections.”
Economic Returns to Communist Party Membership: Evidence from Urban Chinese Twins (2007, neutral): “Sicular, 2000; Lam, 2003; Li, et al., 2005, 2006; Liu, 2003).1 Many studies have found that”
Political connections, financing constraints, and the optimization of innovation efficiency among China's private enterprises (2015, background): “Meanwhile, Li et al. (2006) also consider that acquired preferential loans help private enterprises obtain access to appropriate credit resources from local financial institutions.”
The Dynamics of Political Embeddedness in China* (2017, neutral): “Listed firms that become politically embedded develop closer ties to and greater visibility with state officials, so they can more easily per-suade bureaucrats to enforce regulations that protect firms’ interests (Li, Meng, and Zhang, 2006).”
Player and Referee Roles Held Jointly: The Effect of State Ownership on China’s Regulatory Enforcement Against Fraud (2010, background): “Li et al. (2006) observe that, due to the excessive government regulation and the weak legal system, private entrepreneurs also try to participate in politics in order to acquire certain privileges or resources brought about by their political connections.”
Mixing business with politics: Political participation by entrepreneurs in China (2015, background): “Governments in transition economies often intervene by imposing comprehensive regulations that obstruct the development of a sound private sector (De Soto, 1989; Hellman and Kaufmann, 2003; Li et al., 2006; World Bank, 2004, 2012).”
Corporate Social Responsibility Reporting in China: Symbol or Substance? (2011, positive): “It equals 1 when the CEO either is or has been an officer of the central or regional governments and 0 otherwise (Bai, Lu, and Tao, 2006; Li, Meng, and Zhang, 2006).”
Political connections, financing and firm performance: Evidence from Chinese private firms ☆ (2008, background): “Table A1 Definitions of variables Variable name Definition Owner's attributes Education Years of schooling Party membership A dummy variable which equals 1 if an entrepreneur has become a party member before the establishment of the private firm, and 0 otherwise Former public firm manager A dummy va”