The structure of ownership and corporate acquisition strategies

By P. Wright, Mark Kroll, Augustine A. Lado, B. F. Ness. 2002

217 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Finance, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/f867f2f824b8c70e1841f68e1e3321aed802925f

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Citations in the corpus

Owners on Both Sides of the Deal: Mergers and Acquisitions and Overlapping Institutional Ownership (2008, background): “, 1997; Paul, 2007) and (2) providing managers with appropriate equity or stock-based incentives (Sanders, 2001; Wright et al., 2002b).”
Understanding the Innovation Behavior of Family Firms* (2015, background): “These factors, then, are likely to push family firms toward safer practices (Wright et al. 2002).”
Ownership as a Form of Corporate Governance (2010, unknown): “…equity fostering less risky acquisitions but blockholders and certain © 2010 The Authors Journal of Management Studies © 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd and Society for the Advancement of Management Studies institutional owners pressing for higher risk acquisitions (Wright et al., 1996, 2002).”
A Bayesian operationalization of the resource‐based view (2004, background): “For example, recent studies examining the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) of acquirers indicate that acquiring firms usually experience a negative effect on mar ket returns (Anand and Singh, 1997; Capron and Pistre, 2002; Hayward, 2002; Wright et al., 2002).”
CEO Hubris and Firm Risk Taking in China: The Moderating Role of Managerial Discretion (2010, background): “…firm risk taking (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998).7 In addition, it is possible that the presence of contingency-based incentives, such as stock options, might increase CEOs’ willingness to take risks (Sanders, 2001; Sanders & Hambrick, 2007; Wright et al., 2002, 2007).”
Institutional investors, shareholder activism, and earnings management (2011, background): “…associated with Tobin's Q Thomsen and Pedersen (2000) Largest owner percentage Positively related to market (MBV) and accounting (ROA) performance Wright et al. (2002) Blockholder ownership percentage, outsiders Outside blockholders did not affect risk taking Executive compensation & ownership…”