Distortion and Risk in Optimal Incentive Contracts

By G. Baker. 2002

285 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/f84e575772bc023ea7c8b598da48dcb317bca326

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

In Economics and Econometrics

In Management Science and Operations Research

Citations in the corpus

Employee Selection as a Control System (2012, unknown): “…on outcomes in the context of bank lending, and studies that have been conducted in this context point to the exceeding rarity of this practice with typical incentive contracts based on loan originations rather than outcomes (Baker 2002, Agarwal and Wang 2008, Liberti and Mian 2009, Liberti et. al.”
Relations among Measures, Climate of Control, and Performance Measurement Models* (2007, background): “An expanded analysis of relations made us realize that logical and 14 At the suggestion of a reviewer, we investigated “distortion” in the company’s performance targets (Baker 2002); that is, we test whether distributors’ performance ratings (red, yellow, green) are consistent with profitability.”
Using School Choice Lotteries to Test Measures of School Effectiveness (2014, background): “If high-stakes school accountability ratings are biased or inaccurate, they are unlikely to improve performance and may lead to wasteful compliance behavior (e.g., Baker 2002).”
The Off-Switch Game (2016, background): “The work of Baker (2002) is somewhat relevant to our problem: he describes a principal–agent game in which the agent’s incentives depend on an inaccurate performance measure and shows that the strength of the incentives should be reduced in proportion to the misalignment between the performance…”
Teacher quality policy when supply matters (2012, background): “The potential for manipulation and, worse, goal distortion militates against high-stakes uses of the performance measures (Baker, 1992, 2002).”
Renewal Through Reorganization: The Value of Inconsistencies Between Formal and Informal Organization (2009, unknown): “2 ) 1 ( 2 ) ( 2 2 x x x c − + = (ii) The assumption of independent quadratic costs of effort is common in the literature on teams, and agency theory in general (Baker, 2002; Cremer, 1990; Gibbons, 1998; Prendergast, 1999; Siggelkow, 2002) and simply captures the notion of increasing marginal disutil”
Teacher Incentives and Student Achievement: Evidence from New York City Public Schools (2011, background): “[3] Baker, George.”