Information, Power, and War

By William Reed. American Political Science Review, 2003

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Goliath's Curse: Coercive Threats and Asymmetric Power (2010, background): “…influence bargaining leverage ~for example, Fearon 1997a!+ 27+ Examples of models that adopt some or all of these assumptions include Schultz 2001; Sartori 2002; and Reed 2003, among many others+ second assumption restricts the challenger from backing down once a threat is issued, so its threat…”
How Initiators End Their Wars: The Duration of Warfare and the Terms of Peace (2004, background): “Instead of discounting for distance, I use the number of troops involved at the outbreak of hostilities, not the total size of the national army, unless there was no other conflict that the state was involved in at the time and the war was close to its home territory.”
Uncertainty and Incentives in Crisis Bargaining: Game-Free Analysis of International Conflict (2011, unknown): “∗We have benefited from comments received at the University of Rochester’s Peter D. Watson Center, Princeton’s International Relations Colloquium, the UCSD IR Seminar, and participants at various professional conferences.”