The Evolution of Strong Reciprocity
By Samuel Bowles, Herbert Gintis. 2000
159 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Sociology and Political Science
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/f690eb28d85ebede0235981c4ced7183aa58e03b
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Sociology and Political Science
- Ernst Fehr
- Armin Falk
- Herbert Gintis
- Samuel Bowles
- Simon Gächter
- Michael Gurven
- Stuart A. West
- Klaus M. Schmidt
Citations in the corpus
- Walrasian Economics in Retrospect (2000, background): “…as genetic inheritance and one can demonstrate that prosocial traits (i.e., traits that are non-selfish and promote the well being of others) could have evolved under the joint influence of cultural and genetic transmission [Boyd and Richerson 1985, Sober and Wilson 1998, Bowles and Gintis 1998].”
- Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments (2000, unknown): “28 There are a few papers that aim at providing evolutionary explanations of punishment traits in a free riding context (Axelrod 1986, Boyd and Richerson 1992, Bowles and Gintis 1998, Sethi and Somanathan 1996).”
- Reciprocity, Self-Interest and the Welfare State (2000, background): “On the structural basis of pro-social norms in a game-theoretic framework, see Bowles and Gintis (1998b).”
- The Natural History of Human Food Sharing and Cooperation: A Review and a New Multi-Individual Approach to the Negotiation of Norms (2001, methodology): “We base this proposal on a result obtained by Boyd and Richerson (1992), and treated more recently by Bowles and Gintis (2000), in which cooperation is modeled with punishment.”
- Homo Reciprocans: Survey Evidence on Behavioural Outcomes (2008, background): “The prevalence of reciprocity calls for an intensified investigation of the economic consequences of reciprocity, e.g., for labour relations and social policy issues ( Bowles and Gintis, 1998 ).”
- Altruism towards strangers in need: costly signaling in an industrial society (2010, unknown): “…explaining generous acts towards non-kin: indirect reciprocity (Alexander, 1987; Milinski, Semmann, Bakker, & Krambeck, 2001), strong reciprocity (Bowles & Gintis, 2004; Fehr, Fischbacher, & Gachter, 2002), reputation-building (Bereczkei, Birkas, & Kerekes, 2007; Milinski, Semmann, & Krambeck,…”
- Cooperation in humans: competition between groups and proximate emotions (2010, background): “However, while this idea has been supported by a number of theoretical models, there is a lack of empirical work testing the predictions of this theory (Bowles & Gintis 2004; Boyd, Gintis, Bowles, & ⁎ Corresponding author.”
- Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity (2001, background): “In the meantime there is also a large and growing literature on the evolutionary origins of reciprocity (see, e.g., Bowles and Gintis 1999, Gintis 2000, Sethi and Somananthan forthcoming and 2000).”
- The Empirics of Social Capital and Economic Development: A Critical Perspective (2005, background): “…the diffusion of trust and logics of reciprocity play in shaping different kinds of transactions (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, Arnott and Stiglitz, 1991, Berg, Dickaut and McCabe, 1995, Fehr, Gatcher and Kirchsteiger, 1997, Frey, 1997, Bowles and Gintis, 1998, Fehr and Gatcher, 2000, Sugden, 2000).”