Inefficient Foreign Borrowing: A Dual- and Common-Agency Perspective
By Jean Tirole. 2003
181 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Finance
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/f5413c9315f09cf2b8921f7548a81da79c8adfd2
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Economics and Econometrics
- Anton Korinek
- Olivier Jeanne
- P. Gourinchas
- C. Arellano
- Hélène Rey
- Emmanuel Farhi
- Javier Bianchi
- Joseph E. Stiglitz
In Finance
- Anton Korinek
- Olivier Jeanne
- P. Gourinchas
- C. Arellano
- Enrique G. Mendoza
- Javier Bianchi
- J. Hatchondo
- Leonardo Martinez
Citations in the corpus
- Default risk and income fluctuations in emerging economies (2008, background): “Tirole (2003) also present a model where international private lending is distorted by government interventions.”
- Global Safe Assets (2012, background): “The 26This is a version of the common agency problem modeled by Tirole (2003).”
- Sovereign Debt without Default Penalties (2009, unknown): “Tirole (2003) investigates a government’s incentives to take a costly action that affects the ability of domestic corporations to repay foreign debt.”
- Deadly Embrace: Sovereign and Financial Balance Sheets Doom Loops (2018, unknown): “See e.g. Tirole (2003).”
- Debt Maturity and the International Financial Architecture (2004, unknown): “With a large number of entrepreneurs this may no longer be the case because of the common agency problem emphasized by Tirole (2003).”
- Regulating Capital Flows to Emerging Markets: An Externality View (2018, background): “5See Jeanne (2003); Tirole (2003); Jeanne (2009) for example.”
- The New Economics of Prudential Capital Controls: A Research Agenda (2011, background): “Furthermore, we focus on welfare-maximizing prudential capital controls and do not consider political economy distortions that may lead governments to impose capital controls (see, for example, Tirole, 2003).”
- The Interrelationships Among Informal Institutions, Formal Institutions, and Inward Foreign Direct Investment (2013, unknown): “…deficits and foreign borrowing to promote capital availability for domestic entities sometimes provides incentives for governments to behave opportunistically toward MNEs by, for example, altering policies that attracted MNEs after they have made investments (e.g., Teece, 1986b; Tirole, 2003).”