Default risk and income fluctuations in emerging economies

By C. Arellano. 2008

1,367 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/ae53517e88a265bce32767046ad5b17b5334f430

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Citations in the corpus

Estimation of Nonparametric Conditional Moment Models with Possibly Nonsmooth Generalized Residuals (2011, methodology): “NPIV example (2): For this model with identity weighting W = I, E[‖m(X, h)‖(2)W ] is obviously lower semicontinuous on (H, ‖·‖s) with a norm ||h||s = ||h||L2(Rd,fY2 ) or = supy∈Rd |(1 + |y|2)−θ/2h(y)| for some θ ≥ 0.”
Quantitative Properties of Sovereign Default Models: Solution Methods Matter (2010, methodology): “The figure replicates the counterfactual exercise presented in Arellano (2008) on page 707.”
Recovery Before Redemption: A Theory of Delays in Sovereign Debt Renegotiations (2009, neutral): “[3] Arellano, Cristina.”
Local Currency Sovereign Risk (2013, positive): “The pricing of LC debt was also examined by Burger and Warnock (2007) and Burger et al. (2012), who studied ex-post returns on LC bonds using the J.”
The Pass-Through of Sovereign Risk (2016, methodology): “Arellano et al. (2012), Gilchrist et al.”
Revealing the Hidden Language of Complex Networks (2014, background): “By year 2001, poor management in great part led to Argentina’s real GDP shrinkage, unemployment sky-rocketed, and the international trade plunged, so Argentina turned into a peripheral economy 41 .”
Inequality, Leverage and Crises: The Case of Endogenous Default (2013, neutral): “These facts are relevant to the nexus between inequality, leverage and crises, 8See Francis (2009) for a discussion on the di¤erences between models with a bequest motive and models with capitalist spirit preferences.”
Sovereign Debt Relief and its Aftermath (2016, background): “Moreover, the debt levels decrease signi cantly (columns (6) and (8)), compared to the counterfactual on European non-defaulters.”
Self-Fulfilling Debt Crises: A Quantitative Analysis (2019, critical): “On the contrary, previous research - for instance Arellano and Ramanarayanan (2012), Aguiar and Amador (2014) and Dovis (2014) - has shown that a shortening of maturity is typically an optimal response of the sovereign when facing a default crises driven by fundamental shocks: a shortening of debt m”
Fiscal Rules and the Sovereign Default Premium (2022, positive): “The second assumption implies that, as in Arellano and Ramanarayanan (2010), Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2012) and Hatchondo and Martinez (2009), when the government defaults, it does so on all current and future debt obligations. This is consistent with the behavior of defaulting governments in reali”
The dynamics of sovereign debt crises and bailouts (2016, positive): “The model combines Arellano (2008) with Cole and Kehoe (2000), follows much of their specifications and studies the scope for minimalistic ”fair value” bailouts.”
Rent seeing distortions and fiscal procyclicality (2011, result): “These values are also very similar to estimates obtained when looking at the actual output process of Argentina, as in Arellano (2008), for example.”
Sovereign Defaults: The Price of Haircuts (2011, background): “…collected restructuring details to 1 See Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) or, more recently, Kletzer and Wright (2000), Amador (2003), Aguiar and Gopinath (2006), Kovrijnykh and Szentes (2007), Arellano (2008), Sandleris (2008) and Yue (2010).”