Sovereign Debt without Default Penalties

By Alexander Guembel, Oren Sussman. 2009

133 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Finance, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/7a6dfe13115d77c9256943e89efa8cc8c1792769

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Finance

1. Michael Tomz
2. Mark L. J. Wright
3. J. Hatchondo
4. Leonardo Martinez
5. Christoph Trebesch

In Strategy and Management

1. Mark L. J. Wright
2. Michael Tomz

Citations in the corpus

• Debt Dilution and Sovereign Default Risk (2011, unknown): “For instance, Alfaro and Kanczuk (2005), Cole et al. (1995), Hatchondo et al. (2009), and Guembel and Sussman (2009) discuss how sovereign defaults may be triggered by changes in political circumstances.”
• The Optimal Level of International Reserves For Emerging Market Countries: A New Formula and Some Applications (2011, unknown): “6See Guembel and Sussman (2005) for a model in which a country s willingness to repay foreign debt is endogenous to domestic political economy factors.”
• What is a Sustainable Public Debt (2015, unknown): “…political economy and sovereign default, which largely focuses on external default (e.g. Amador (2003), Dixit and Londregan (2000), D’Erasmo (2011), Guembel and Sussman (2009), Hatchondo, Martinez, and Sapriza (2009) and Tabellini (1991)), but includes studies like those of Alesina and Tabellini…”
• Empirical Research on Sovereign Debt and Default (2013, background): “One possibility is that governments cannot repay their debts selectively (Broner, Martin and Ventura 2010; Broner and Ventura 2011; Guembel and Sussman 2009).”