Status in Markets

By Sheryl B. Ball, Catherine C. Eckel, Philip J. Grossman, William R. Zame. 2001

411 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research, Safety Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/f18ba9a55aec8755b3476e0e5d9deb9754185dec

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Citations in the corpus

Fairness and redistribution (2005, neutral): “Revised: January 2003”
Facing Your Opponents (2014, neutral): “Ball et al. (2001) provide experimental evidence that social status plays a role in market exchanges.”
Asset Prices and Institutional Investors (2013, neutral): “Ball et al. (2001) present evidence from a lab experiment demonstrating that subjects care about status and that the preference for status affects economic outcomes.”
Groups Reward Individual Sacrifice: The Status Solution to the Collective Action Problem (2009, positive): “, Sewell, Haller, and Portes 1969) and experimental research shows that people will forgo material profits to gain status (Ball and Eckel 1996, 1998; Ball et al. 2001; Huberman, Loch, and Onculer 2004).”
Inequality and public good provision: An experimental analysis (2008, neutral): “In another experimental study in which differences among subjects were induced, Ball et al. (2001) reported that the way in which differences were denoted mattered greatly.”
The Effect of Status on Charitable Giving (2010, positive): “Specifically, we study behavior in a voluntary contribution game where we use the procedures of Ball et al. (2001) to induce some individuals to have higher status than others.”
The Behavioralist Goes to School: Leveraging Behavioral Economics to Improve Educational Performance. NBER Working Paper No. 18165. (2012, neutral): “Such preferences can lead to underinvestment when (as in education) the returns to achievement are largely delayed.2 1See Ball et al. (2001) and Huberman et al. (2004) on status; Blanes i Vidal et al. (2009), Tran and Zeckhauser (2009) and Barankay (2011) on relative performance feedback; and…”
Status As a Valued Resource (2004, positive): “This point is consistent with studies in which people with higher status were conceded higher benefits in negotia- tions (Ball and Eckel 1996) and market interchanges (Ball et al. 2001), and were credited with different personality traits by their cosubjects (Gerber 1996).”
Contests for Status (2007, positive): “…for explaining behavior has been long recognized by sociologists and economists.4 Recent happiness research shows how wage rank affects workers’ well-being (Brown et al. 2004), and experimental studies pointed out that social status may play a role also in market exchanges (Ball et al. 2001).”
Awards as Compensation (2007, neutral): “Awards may bring recipients material benefits in economic interactions (Ball et al., 2001). Awards certainly represent more than just money, and the recipients experience them as a special form of social distinction, setting them apart from the other employees. European Management Review (2007) 4, 6”
The Dark Side of Competition for Status (2014, neutral): “…the importance given by individuals to status and how it affects behavior in negotiations (Ball and Eckel, 1996), markets (Ball and Eckel, 1998; Ball et al., 2001), coordination games (Eckel and Wilson, 2007), and organizations either in cooperative settings (Eckel et al., 2009) or in…”
Social Identity and Inequality: The Impact of China's Hukou System (2015, positive): “making identity salient has important effects on preferences and economic behavior (Ball et al., 2001; Benjamin, Choi and Strickland, 2010).”
The Effect of Gender Diversity on Angel Group Investment (2011, neutral): “See, for instance, Glaeser, Laibson, Scheinkman, and Soutter (2000) and Ball, Eckel, Grossman, and Zame (2001).”
Fairness and Redistribution: U.S. Versus Europe (2003, neutral): “In double action market experiments, Ball et al. (1996) report a similar sensitivity of the division of surplus between buyers and sellers on whether market status is random or earned.”