Capitalism from below: Markets and Institutional Change in China

By Xuebing Dong, Zhu Hui. 2013

152 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Political Science and International Relations

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/f02c067306f342c6a2819a035e523aa0d4436e2c

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In Political Science and International Relations

Citations in the corpus

State Ownership and Firm Innovation in China: An Integrated View of Institutional and Efficiency Logics (2017, background): “For example, as China’s capital market develops, firms are able to find alternative sources of credit funds rather than relying only on state-owned banks (Nee and Opper, 2012).”
Corporate Social Responsibility Under Authoritarian Capitalism: Dynamics and Prospects of State-Led and Society-Driven CSR (2017, background): “However, there is also significant scope for policy formulation and implementation at lower provincial and municipal levels in China which is encouraged as a basis for policy experimentation and best practice development (Huang, 2008; Nee & Opper, 2012).”
A Composition-Based View of Firm Growth (2015, background): “Numerous studies have documented the weaknesses of EEEs, such as the lack of core technologies, low brand awareness, and weak product differentiation (Luo et al., 2011; Nee & Opper, 2012; Tan & Peng, 2003; Wright, Filatotchev, Hoskisson, & Peng, 2005).”
Risk Aversion and Guanxi Activities: A Behavioral Analysis of CEOs in China (2017, methodology): “‘Localists’ embedded in densely clustered production markets can draw on frequent community exchange and face-to-face contacts that help to evaluate tacit information on future policy directions and the helpfulness of distinct government officials (Nee & Opper, 2012).”
The Dynamics of Political Embeddedness in China* (2017, unknown): “…load, offer relief from taxation and fees, and make it easier to acquire resources that are controlled by the state, notably bank loans and land-use rights; they also help improve legal oversight to stave off predatory behavior (Y. Lin, 2001; Chen and Dickson, 2010; Nee and Opper, 2010, 2012).”
How culture influences the way entrepreneurs deal with uncertainty in inter-organizational relationships: The case of returnee versus local entrepreneurs in China (2016, background): “Based on a comparative examination of the context-rich Eastern environment and the object-focused Western environment, Nisbett and Masuda (2003) found that people from different cultures exhibit different patterns of attention and perception.”
Much of the ‘economics of property rights’ devalues property and legal rights (2015, background): “But – following 22 Nee and Opper (2013) noted inadequate legal institutions protecting property rights and enforcing contracts for private ﬁrms in post-1978 China.”
The Influence of Formal and Informal Institutional Voids on Entrepreneurship (2020, background): “Robust informal institutions can still provide access to critical resources, establish expectations for transactions, and ensure monitoring and enforcement of local activities (Portes & Sensenbrenner, 1993) to where deviants are ostracized and/or face community sanctions (Nee & Opper, 2012).”
Local Government as Institutional Entrepreneur: Public–Private Collaborative Partnerships in Fostering Regional Entrepreneurship (2018, unknown): “As a polity, China is relatively decentralized with respect to its organization (Xu, 2011); regional variations thus illustrate the dynamics and changes in regulatory frameworks and institutions, as exemplified by the emergence of the Chinese private entrepreneurial sector (Nee & Opper, 2012).”