Rewards and Sanctions and the Provision of Public Goods in One-Shot Settings

By James M. Walker, Matthew Halloran. 2004

147 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Demography, Safety Research, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/ee52a54b148084c570f154ce53061c062a882c7d

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Citations in the corpus

The limits of self-governance when cooperators get punished: Experimental evidence from urban and rural Russia (2011, methodology): “See also the one-shot experiments without punishment of List (2004) and the one-shot experiments with and without punishment of Walker and Halloran (2004), Cubitt et al. (2008) Our research assistants helped those who had problems, according to strictly determined rules how to answer questions.”
Sustaining cooperation in laboratory public goods experiments: a selective survey of the literature (2011, background): “Walker and Halloran (2004) look at the efficacy of rewards and/or sanctions in a sequence of one-shot games.”
The promise of Mechanical Turk: how online labor markets can help theorists run behavioral experiments. (2012, background): “…all but the final period of fixed length public goods games (Sefton et al., 2007; Sutter et al., 2010), and in indefinitely repeated public goods games (Rand et al., 2009b), while neither reward nor punishment promotes cooperation in a single one-shot public goods game (Walker and Halloran, 2004).”
VOTING, PUNISHMENT, AND PUBLIC GOODS (2007, unknown): “In addition, Walker and Halloran (2004) reported no difference in contribution and efficiency levels across treatments with and without reward and sanction mechanisms in one-shot public-good games.”
Norm Enforcement: Anger, Indignation or Reciprocity? (2012, background): “In the second, SPP treatment, participants could only sanction members of their own group, similar to Walker and Halloran (2004) and Gächter and Herrman (2005).”
A Model of Third Parties' Morally Motivated Responses to Mistreatment in Organizations (2011, background): “…is often studied in the context of public goods and social dilemma game experiments (e.g., Falk, Fehr, & Fischbacher, 2005; Fehr & Gächter, 2000; Gächter & Herrmann, 2009; Walker & Halloran, 2004; Yamagishi, 1986) and has also been verified in a third party context (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004).”