Enhanced Privacy ID from Bilinear Pairing for Hardware Authentication and Attestation

By Ernie Brickell, Jiangtao Li. 2010

157 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, Hardware and Architecture

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Artificial Intelligence

1. Florian Tramèr
2. Dawn Song
3. Yang Zhang
4. Mario Fritz
5. Michael Backes
6. Dan Boneh
7. Elaine Shi
8. Ahmed Salem

In Hardware and Architecture

1. Florian Tramèr
2. Ari Juels
3. Fan Zhang
4. Dawn Song
5. Warren He
6. Raymond Cheng
7. Nicholas Hynes
8. Victor Costan

Citations in the corpus

• Ekiden: A Platform for Confidentiality-Preserving, Trustworthy, and Performant Smart Contracts (2018, background): “Suppose the execution on Comp results in an output stct and an attestation σTEE (a signature [15] over the contract code and stct).”
• VC3: Trustworthy Data Analytics in the Cloud Using SGX (2015, methodology): “This assumption follows from collisionresistance for H and EDigest and UF-CMA for the EPID group signature scheme [15].”
• Sealed-Glass Proofs: Using Transparent Enclaves to Prove and Sell Knowledge (2017, background): “SGX actually makes use of a group signature scheme with efficient revocation support [33].”
• Town Crier: An Authenticated Data Feed for Smart Contracts (2016, methodology): “On invoking this function, an en-clave obtains a measure of time relative to a reference point indexed by a nonce.”
• Formal Abstractions for Attested Execution Secure Processors (2017, methodology): “Secure processors such as SGX rely on group signatures and other anonymous credential techniques [15, 16] to offer “anonymous attestation”.”
• Innovative Technology for CPU Based Attestation and Sealing (2013, methodology): “To overcome this problem Intel has introduced an extension to the Direct Anonymous Attestation scheme used by the TPM [5] &[6] called Intel® Enhanced Privacy ID (EPID)[7] that is used by the Quoting Enclave to sign enclave attestations.”
• Intel SGX Explained (2016, methodology): “The Attestation Key uses Intel’s Enhanced Privacy ID (EPID) cryptosystem [26], which is a group signature scheme that is intended to preserve the anonymity of the signers.”
• MLCapsule: Guarded Offline Deployment of Machine Learning as a Service (2018, methodology): “report for the third party is generated by a so called Quoting Enclave that uses an anonymous group signature scheme (Intel Enhanced Privacy ID [10]) to sign the data.”