The effect of false-name bids in combinatorial auctions: new fraud in internet auctions

By Makoto Yokoo, Y. Sakurai, S. Matsubara. Games Econ. Behav., 2004

295 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/eda3b1c3204590d07855c6f6dca69edb85d6ed41

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

1. Robert W. Day
2. Clay Shields
3. Brian Neil Levine
4. N. B. Margolin
5. Paul R. Milgrom
6. Peter Cramton
7. Yinlam Chow
8. Eric Budish

Citations in the corpus

• A Survey of Solutions to the Sybil Attack (2006, background): “[91, 92] describe a Sybil attack in combinatorial auction protocols, where the independence of different valuations of goods is attacked.”
• Core-selecting package auctions (2008, background): “11 Yokoo et al. (2004) were the first to emphasize the importance of “false name bidding” and how it could arise in the anonymous environment of Internet auctions.”