Ties that Bind: How Business Connections Affect Mutual Fund Activism
By Dragana Cvijanovic, Amil Dasgupta, K. Zachariadis. 2016
138 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Finance
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/ed82fdb03a27363e08aa5a493b99639ee34fe160
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Accounting
- Alma Cohen
- L. Bebchuk
- Matthew C. Ringgenberg
- D. Macciocchi
- D. Heath
- Roni Michaely
- O. Faleye
- Luc Renneboog
In Finance
- Matthew C. Ringgenberg
- D. Macciocchi
- D. Heath
- Roni Michaely
- Alma Cohen
- L. Bebchuk
- Yaniv Grinstein
- Martin C. Schmalz
Citations in the corpus
- The Agency Problems of Institutional Investors (2017, background): “Cvijanović, Dasgupta, and Zachariadis (2016) examine contested shareholder proposals where corporate managers care more about votes for their favored position, and find that mutual fund families with business ties to a corporation are more likely to cast pro-management votes in closely contested…”
- Do Index Funds Monitor? (2021, background): “Openly voting against firm management carries a higher cost because it may damage the relationship between the investor and firm management (Cvijanović et al. (2016)).”
- Blockholders: A Survey of Theory and Evidence (2017, unknown): “This private information may be on the cost of working / private benefit from shirking (as in Dasgupta and Piacentino (2015) and Edmans, Levit, and Reilly (2016)) or on the value destroyed by shirking (as in Admati and Pfleiderer (2009) and Fos and Kahn (2016)).”