The Agency Problems of Institutional Investors

By L. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen, S. Hirst. 2017

314 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/af54f8d6d503ab84a232a174985088504b48f5cd

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

1. Florian Ederer
2. M. Giné
3. Miguel Antón
4. Martin C. Schmalz

In Finance

1. Martin C. Schmalz
2. Florian Ederer
3. M. Giné
4. Miguel Antón

Citations in the corpus

• Common Ownership, Competition, and Top Management Incentives (2016, background): “This channel is economically distinct from an alternative reason for relatively weak governance by index funds emphasized by Bebchuk et al. (2017), Bebchuk and Hirst (2019), and Gilje et al. (2020), namely the higher cost of engagement due to a large number of portfolio firms.38 Our model shows that”
• Common-Ownership Concentration and Corporate Conduct (2018, background): “ETFs are one 6 Schmalz contributor to common ownership, and their impact on corporate behavior is subsumed in this survey; Ben-David et al. (2017a) survey the literature on ETF’s impact on asset-market quality.”