Moral hazard, risk aversion and compliance monitoring in agri-environmental policy

By A. Ozanne, T. Hogan, D. Colman. 2001

163 citations recorded by the source corpus.

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Investigating farmers' preferences for the design of agri-environment schemes: a choice experiment approach (2008, unknown): “Other studies apply the principal-agent theory to analyse the design of AES, focusing on the implications of information asymmetries for contract design (e.g. Moxey et al., 1999; Ozanne et al., 2001).”
Asymmetric information and contract design for payments for environmental services (2008, background): “Lohmann (1998), Choe and Fraser (1998, 1999), Ozanne et al. (2001) , and Fraser (2002), and Hart and Latacz-Lohman 2004).2”
What does the public want from agriculture and the countryside? A review of evidence and methods (2004, background): “…The question of efficient compensation has been examined in an extensive literature on the design of specific support schemes (Colman et al., 1991), and theoretical papers examining government to farmer compensation transactions under conditions of information asymmetry (Ozanne et al., 2001).”
Cost-effective design of agri-environmental payment programs: U.S. experience in theory and practice (2008, background): “Early research on targeting showed significant potential for gain through benefit–cost targeting in the CRP (Reichelderfer and Boggess, 1988; Ribaudo et al., 1990).”