Inference with an Incomplete Model of English Auctions

By Philip A. Haile, Elie Tamer. Journal of Political Economy, 2003

518 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research, Visual Arts and Performing Arts

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/eb23296394159652ee965152bd65938bece2b240

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Citations in the corpus

Intersection bounds: estimation and inference (2009, background): “1Examples include monotone instrumental variables and the returns to schooling (Manski and Pepper (2000)), English auctions (Haile and Tamer (2003)), the returns to language skills (Gonzalez (2005)), set identification with Tobin regressors (Chernozhukov, Rigobon, and Stoker (2007)), endogeneity…”
Upstream Innovation and Product Variety in the U.S. Home PC Market (2014, unknown): “Song [2006, 2007], Gordon [2008], and Goettler and Gordon [2008] study the upstream CPU market.”
Impossibility Results for Nondifferentiable Functionals (2012, background): “Then, considering local alternatives around P0 will capture the situation where two (or more) of the elements in the minimum defining κ are close to each other, which is the source of the bias problem highlighted by Haile and Tamer (2003). Suppose we have a parametric submodel Pf with parameter θ = ”
Moment Inequalities and Their Application (2015, background): “Similar issues arise in obtaining the upper and lower bounds to the distribution of values in independent private value auctions; see Haile and Tamer (2003). It suggests a role for a small sample correction, but that is a topic beyond the scope of this paper.”
Partial identification of spread parameters (2010, background): “Haile and Tamer (2003) showed how moderate rationality restrictions on bidders’ behavior yield quite narrow bounds (FU FL) on the distribution functions of valuations.”
Nonparametric Tests for Common Values at First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions (2004, unknown): “and Haile (2006a)), and further by ambiguity regarding the appropriate interpretation of losing bids (e.g., Bikhchandani, Haile, and Riley (2002), Haile and Tamer (2003) ).”
Adaptive test of conditional moment inequalities (2011, background): “,m where φ(·) is a certain (known) increasing function, see equation (3) in Haile and Tamer (2003). A similar lower bound follows from the assumption that bidders do not allow opponents to win at a price they would like to beat. Parameterizing the function F (·, ·) and selecting a finite set V = {v1”
Discrete Bids and Empirical Inference in Divisible Good Auctions (2011, methodology): “We may be able to use both necessary conditions for bidding (2) and (3) and inequalities implied by assumptions on the primitives and by the data to obtain the set of all possible marginal valuation functions that would rationalize the data, in a similar way to Haile and Tamer (2003).”