Board Seat Accumulation by Executives: A Shareholder's Perspective

By Tod Perry, U. Peyer. 2005

324 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/e98972f605d667c5c1022d2a75208b1f5c46266f

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Citations in the corpus

The Price of a CEO's Rolodex (2012, background): “Presumably, firms with existing connections through non-CEO directors or board members already are afforded network benefits (see, for example, Perry and Peyer (2005) and Güner, Malmendier and Tate (2008)).”
Are busy boards detrimental (2013, unknown): “Furthermore, Perry and Peyer (2005) find that directors who are employed at firms with fewer agency problems can enhance firm value by accepting additional directorships.”
Financial Expertise of Directors (2008, methodology): “Our analysis complements a growing literature relating board characteristics to firm performance (Fich and Shivdasani, 2006; Perry and Peyer, 2005) and extends the analysis to specific corporate policies.”
Do Corporate Boards Affect Firm Performance? New Evidence from the Financial Crisis (2012, unknown): “…meeting frequencies (Vafeas, 1999), board meeting attendance problems (Adams and Ferreira, 2009), director age (Shivdasani and Yermack, 1999), director tenure (Vafeas, 2003), directorship (Ferris et al., 2003; Perry and Peyer, 2005), and board shareholdings (Shivdasani, 1993; Bhagat et al., 1999).”
Is Busy Really Busy? Board Governance Revisited (2013, unknown): “Perry and Peyer (2005) also argue that “sender” firms can benefit from additional directorships since their directors can learn”
Are Busy Boards Effective Monitors (2006, unknown): “Perry and Peyer (2005) report a comparable frequency of busy outside directors in their sample.”
The relation between board size and firm performance in firms with a history of poor operating performance (2010, background): “et al. (2003) and Perry and Peyer (2005) on the importance of board seats.”
Multiple directorships and corporate diversification (2008, unknown): “13 Perry and Peyer (2005) find that the average number of outside directorships in their sample is 0.”
Board Interlocks and Firm Performance: Toward a Combined Agency–Resource Dependence Perspective (2018, background): “Following this perspective, research finds that board interlocks reduce firm performance (e.g., Fich, 2005; Perry & Peyer, 2005; Rosenstein & Wyatt, 1994), thereby leading to explicit prescriptions about limiting board interlocks (Neff, 1998).”
Does Gender Matter in the Boardroom? Evidence from the Market Reaction to Mandatory New Director Announcements (2011, unknown): “Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) examine 373 independent outsider appointments in a smaller sample of 341 Fortune 500 firms from 1994 to 1996 and find an average 3 day (-1,1) CAR of -0.”
Director Human Capital, Information Processing Demands, and Board Effectiveness (2014, background): “However, to date, research support for this idea has been mixed (Ferris, Jagannathan, & Pritchard, 2003; Perry & Peyer, 2005).”
The association between integrated reporting and firm valuation (2015, unknown): “The governance literature generally suggests that as boards become increasingly independent of managers, their monitoring effectiveness increases, thereby decreasing managerial opportunism and enhancing firm performance (Gelb 2000; Perry and Peyer 2005; Linck et al. 2008; Lee et al. 2008, 2009).”