Agency Problems of Corporate Philanthropy

By Ronald W. Masulis, S. W. Reza. 2015

850 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/5bc4241bcca0c84d014e0d51304bd8e0ff262461

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Citations in the corpus

The Pollution Premium (2023, background): “Sixth, stock prices of high-emission firms may be temporarily discounted due to investors’ concerns with respect to their weak corporate governance and monitoring (Masulis and Reza (2015), Cheng, Hong, and Shue (2013), Glossner (2018), Hoepner, Oikonomou, Sautner, Starks, and Zhou (2019)).”
Banking sector reactions to COVID-19: The role of bank-specific factors and government policy responses (2021, unknown): “This finding complements the literature documenting that while ESG and CSR activities benefit the executives of firms, they might lead to reductions in shareholder value (Bénabou and Tirole, 2010; Masulis and Reza, 2015).”
Corporate Governance, Integrated Reporting and the Use of Credibility-enhancing Mechanisms on Integrated Reports (2019, methodology): “When applying agency theory to non-ﬁnancial reporting, however, prior studies consider companies disclosing CSR as ‘dan-gerous’ (Levitt, 1958) and the existence of CSR to be a signal of an agency problem within the company (Masulis & Reza, 2015).”
Government Initiated Corporate Social Responsibility Activities: Evidence from a Poverty Alleviation Campaign in China (2020, unknown): “Masulis and Reza (2015) find that the preferred charities of a firm’s CEO receive more philanthropic donations from the firm, suggesting an agency problem associated with CSR spending.”
Economic policy uncertainty, stakeholder engagement, and environmental, social, and governance practices: The moderating effect of competition (2020, background): “Following this view, many researchers claim that CSR creates agency problems in a way that managers engage in socially responsible activities at the expense of shareholders (Borghesi, Houston, & Naranjo, 2014; Krüger, 2015; Masulis & Reza, 2015).”
Be nice to your innovators: employee treatment and corporate innovation performance (2016, background): “(2014) and Masulis and Reza (2014) show that managers are more likely to be concerned with the interests of different stakeholders (including”
Socially responsible corporate customers (2020, background): “, greater cost structure and agency problems) for their corporations (Balotti and Hanks, 1999; Masulis and Reza, 2015).”
Corporate cash holdings: Causes and consequences (2015, unknown): “Finally, Masulis and Reza (2015) examine the use of corporate cash for philanthropic purpose and find such donations are often spent on charities affiliated to independent directors.”
ESG Ratings and Stock Performance during the COVID-19 Crisis (2021, background): “Following this argument, a firm’s CSR performance is either unrelated to its value or can even damage a firm’s valuation because of high agency costs [12,23,24,29].”
Mandatory CSR and sustainability reporting: economic analysis and literature review (2019, background): “In addition, managers may use CSR to pursue personal goals or for their private benefit, in which case CSR gives rise to an agency problem (e.g., Masulis and Reza 2015).21 Given the broad range of motives for CSR, it is perhaps not surprising that empirical studies examining the relation between…”
Corporate Social Responsibility and Firm Debt Maturity (2015, unknown): “Masulis and Reza (2015) argue that corporate giving is likely to reflect conflicts of interest between shareholders and managers, because managers support their own preferred charities with corporate funds, to enhance their personal reputations and social networks.”
Does CSR matter in times of crisis? Evidence from the COVID-19 pandemic (2021, unknown): “, 2020); others suggest that CSR is unrelated to firm value, or can even reduce value due to agency costs (e.g., Bénabou and Tirole, 2010; Cheng et al., 2014; Di Giuli and Kostovetsky, 2014; Masulis and Reza, 2015).”
Corporate donations and shareholder value (2017, background): “The alternative to a foundation is a direct giving program that has the potential advantage hat firms may not be required by international accounting standards to disclose all donations, the reason being that the donations to a variety of projects may—each individually—be small relative to the compa”