The Dynamics of Seller Reputation: Evidence from Ebay

By Luis M. B. Cabral, Ali Hortaçsu. 2010

537 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Management Science and Operations Research, Marketing, Safety Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/e886bf3c6bd22ef0be07cd91dab30e39452bb298

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Management Science and Operations Research

1. Michael L. Anderson
2. S. Tadelis
3. Graziano Abrate
4. Jeremy R. Magruder
5. G. Viglia
6. Caroline Flammer
7. O. Williamson
8. Peter G. Klein

In Marketing

1. G. Viglia
2. Graziano Abrate
3. Michael L. Anderson
4. S. Tadelis
5. Jeremy R. Magruder

In Safety Research

1. Jeremy R. Magruder
2. Michael L. Anderson
3. S. Tadelis
4. Graziano Abrate
5. G. Viglia
6. Jenny C. Aker
7. David J. Deming
8. Simone G. Schaner

Citations in the corpus

• Reputation and Feedback Systems in Online Platform Markets (2016, background): “Dellarocas and Wood (2008) conjecture that the extremely high percent positive reputation measures on eBay are explained by the fact that many buyers who have poor experiences choose to leave no feedback at all.”
• The Big Sort: College Reputation and Labor Market Outcomes (2017, unknown): “A number of studies in industrial organization (e.g., Melnik and Alm, 2002; Hubbard, 2002; Jin and Leslie, 2003; Dranove and Jin, 2010; Cabral and Hortaçsu, 2010) observe that with experience goods the reputation of the seller has a significant e ect upon price; for example, a bottle from a good win”
• Learning from the Crowd: Regression Discontinuity Estimates of the Effects of an Online Review Database (2012, background): “They find that sellers with better ratings attract more bids or experience higher auction prices (Melnik and Alm, 2002; Jin and Kato, 2006; Resnick et al., 2006; Lucking-Reiley et al., 2007; Cabral and Hortaçsu, 2010).”
• Charity as a Substitute for Reputation: Evidence from an Online Marketplace (2012, unknown): “Trade in this market is vulnerable to service problems and seller misrepresentation, and public records of prior transactions are used as assurances of trustworthiness (Houser and Wooders 2006, Resnick et al. 2006, Cabral and Hortacsu 2010).”
• Personal or Product Reputation? Optimizing Revenues in the Sharing Economy (2019, background): “In addition, Cabral and Hortacsu (2010) find that a single negative review on eBay has a significant negative impact on the seller’s overall growth rate.”