Fiscal forecasting: The track record of the IMF, OECD and EC
By M. Artis, Massimiliano Marcellino. 2001
149 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Finance
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/e813dd76fef22b27ea9f8a0a84ce3422f76c784f
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Economics and Econometrics
- Fotios Petropoulos
- Konstantinos Nikolopoulos
- Rob J Hyndman
- Nikolaos Kourentzes
- Allan G. Timmermann
- Vassilios Assimakopoulos
- Evangelos Spiliotis
- Spyros Makridakis
In Finance
- Allan G. Timmermann
- David E. Rapach
- Massimo Guidolin
- Graham Elliott
- Michael P. Clements
- Fotios Petropoulos
- Nikolaos Kourentzes
- Massimiliano Marcellino
Citations in the corpus
- Estimation and Testing of Forecast Rationality under Flexible Loss (2005, methodology): “This application is well suited to demonstrate our methods since, as pointed out by Artis and Marcellino, " the political context in which fiscal deficit forecasts emerge may well be one in which the costs of forecast misses are not symmetric " (Artis and Marcellino, 2001, p. 20).”
- Improving fiscal policy in the EU: the case for independent forecasts (2006, unknown): “Analysing the accuracy of fiscal forecasts produced by international organisations, Artis and Marcellino (2001) acknowledge the key role of economic projections for fiscal policy outcomes, pointing out that poor forecasts underpinning budgetary plans could severely compromise existing fiscal frame”
- Planning to cheat: EU fiscal policy in real time (2009, unknown): “A number of subsequent contributions, such as Favero (2003), Balassone and Francese (2004) and Annett (2006), have estimated fiscal policy rules for a broader set of countries, in particular for the EU or the OECD.”
- The political economy of EDP fiscal forecasts: An empirical assessment (2011, background): “Artis and Marcellino (2001) analyse forecasts by the IMF, the OECD and the European Commission; Brück and Stephan (2006) focus on the latter organisation; Strauch et al. (2004);Moulin and Wierts (2006); Annett (2006); Hallerberg et al. (2009) and Beetsma et al. (2009) resort to national SCPs.”
- Fiscal Policy in Real Time (2012, unknown): “Indeed, OECD fiscal forecasts are generally found to be unbiased, as systematic under or over-predictions of budgetary figures are rare (see in particular Artis and Marcellino (2001)).”
- Forecasting Macroeconomic Variables for the New Member States of the European Union (2005, background): “An alternative remedy in the presence of structural breaks over the forecasting period is to put the forecast back on track by adding past forecast errors to the forecast e.g. Clements and Hendry (1999) and Artis and Marcellino (2001).”
- Forecasting: theory and practice (2020, background): “The first topic has its own interest for long, mainly restricted to international institutions (Artis and Marcellino, 2001).”
- Forecasting Macroeconomic Variables Using Diffusion Indexes in Short Samples with Structural Change (2008, background): “An alternative remedy in the presence of structural breaks over the forecasting period is to put the forecast back on track by adding past forecast errors to the forecast, e.g. Clements and Hendry (1999) and Artis and Marcellino (2001).”
- Budgetary Forecasts in Europe - the Track Record of Stability and Convergence Programmes (2004, methodology): “Following Artis and Marcellino (2001), we can determine the parameter value b/a for our sample assuming that forecasts are optimal given governments’ loss function and setting u(e)’ = 0.16 Under this assumption the ratio of coefficients can be computed as ∑∑= 22 ji eeab .”
- Fi S cal F oreca S ting le SS on S F rom the literature an D challenge S 1 (2007, unknown): “Along these lines, Gentry (1989), Campbell and Ghysels (1995), Artis and Marcellino (1998, 2001), Keereman (1999), Melander et al. (2007), Pons (2000), Strauch et al. (2004), and Bruck and Stephan (2006) detect the presence of biases in the track record of fiscal forecasts of various governmental…”