Planning to cheat: EU fiscal policy in real time
By R. Beetsma, Massimo Giuliodori, Peter Wierts. 2009
167 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Political Science and International Relations
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/1532b609e0bc26f2931f6c8b75702431e251a8a8
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In Economics and Econometrics
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- Álvaro M. Pina
- Nuno Venes
- Era Dabla‐Norris
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- M. Goldstein
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In Political Science and International Relations
Citations in the corpus
- Over-optimistic official forecasts and fiscal rules in the eurozone (2013, methodology): “Most of these authors argue that the systematic over-optimism in ex ante forecasts translates directly into larger ex post deficits, and particularly to deficits larger than targeted under the SGP. Similarly, Beetsma et al (2009) find that realized budget balances among SGP countries on average fall”
- Over-Optimism in Forecasts by Official Budget Agencies and its Implications (2011, unknown): “Most of these authors argue that the systematic over-optimism in ex ante forecasts translates directly into larger ex post deficits, and particularly to deficits larger than targeted under the SGP. Similarly, Beetsma et al. (2009) find that ex post budget balances among SGP countries systematically fal”
- The political economy of EDP fiscal forecasts: An empirical assessment (2011, background): “Artis and Marcellino (2001) analyse forecasts by the IMF, the OECD and the European Commission; Brück and Stephan (2006) focus on the latter organisation; Strauch et al. (2004);Moulin and Wierts (2006); Annett (2006); Hallerberg et al. (2009) and Beetsma et al. (2009) resort to national SCPs.”
- Budget Institutions and Fiscal Performance in Low-Income Countries (2010, background): “Hallerberg, Mark and Jürgen von Hagen, 1999, “Electoral Institutions, Cabinet Negotiations, and Budget Deficits within the European Union,” in James Poterba and Jürgen von Hagen (eds.)”
- A Solution to Fiscal Procyclicality: The Structural Budget Institutions Pioneered by Chile (2011, background): “…systematic over-optimism in ex ante forecasts translates directly into larger ex post deficits, and particularly to deficits larger than targeted under the SGP. Similarly, Beetsma et al (2009) find that ex post budget balances among SGP countries systematically fall short of official ex ante plans.”