Competition in Loan Contracts

By Christine A. Parlour, Uday Rajan. 2001

164 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/e6cbc7de32b2ad07f4b7c6f2b4fc179bd8eae85b

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Economics and Econometrics

1. Michael Peters
2. Marco Di Maggio
3. Vincent Yao
4. P. M. Skiba
5. Will Dobbie
6. Thomas A. Gresik

In Finance

1. Michael Peters
2. Marco Di Maggio
3. Vincent Yao
4. P. M. Skiba
5. Will Dobbie

Citations in the corpus

• Trade credit, collateral liquidation, and borrowing constraints (2010, unknown): “It,Int, EPF = p f H (It,Int) (1 ) SC Int + It A 1 rS SC rB + (1 p) BC ( 22 )”
• Common Agency and the Revelation Principle (2001, background): “Biais, Martimort, and Rochet (1997) and Martimort and Stole (1999a) are concerned with problems where the agent has private information.”
• Public Information and Coordination: Evidence from a Credit Registry Expansion (2011, unknown): “And it will a¤ect debt of single lender …rms if it reduces bank monitoring incentives (Petersen and Rajan 1995, Rajan 1992), lowers …rm reputational incentives (Padilla and Pagano 2000), or reveals hidden …rm debt (Parlour and Rajan 2001; Bisin and Guaitoli 2004; Bennardo, Pagano, and Piccolo 2009).”
• Multiple-Bank Lending, Creditor Rights and Information Sharing (2009, unknown): “This uncertainty is a novel ingredient relative to the relative literature: as we shall see, it creates scope for opportunistic lending that is not present, for instance, in Parlour and Rajan (2001).”
• Information Asymmetries in Consumer Credit Markets: Evidence from Payday Lending (2013, background): “Theory does not rule out either advantageous selection or advantageous incentives (e.g., Bisin and Guaitoli, 2004; Parlour and Rajan, 2001; de Meza and Webb, 2001).”
• Observing unobservables: Identifying information asymmetries with a consumer credit field experiment (2005, unknown): “, Parlour and Rajan (2001)— suggests that the Lender may generate worse repayment by contracting at lower rates with borrowers holding expensive outside debt.”
• Fintech Borrowers: Lax Screening or Cream-Skimming? (2020, background): “8 Other related papers in this literature include: Wolfe and Yoo (2017), Mariotto (2016), Balyuk (2017), Balyuk and Davydenko (2016), and Iyer et al.”