Trade credit, collateral liquidation, and borrowing constraints

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Do Debt Contract Enforcement Costs Affect Financing and Asset Structure (2014, unknown): “ing supply of raw materials but they also have an advantage when it comes to realizing value from the collateral (Fabbri and Menichini (2010)) and may also be better informed about the borrower’s prospects.”
Trade Credit Provision and National Culture (2016, unknown): “For instance, suppliers in collectivist countries are unlikely to sell 9 In a related paper, Fabbri and Menichini (2010) model sellers as having an advantage in both repossessing goods and controlling moral hazard.”
Bargaining power and trade credit (2016, background): “More recently, financial theories argue that suppliers have a lending advantage over financial institutions, due to better information (Biais and Gollier, 1997), lower borrower’s opportunism (Burkart and Ellingsen, 2004), or a liquidation advantage (Fabbri and Menichini, 2010).”
Trade credit and SME profitability (2014, background): “Thus, suppliers can afford to lend to customers at a cheaper rate than banks (Fabbri and Menichini 2010).”
Trade Credit Contracts (2010, unknown): “They may also be better able to extract value from the liquidation of assets in default, generating demand for trade credit from credit-constrained buyers (Petersen and Rajan 1997; Fabbri and Menichini 2010).”