Multiple-Bank Lending, Creditor Rights and Information Sharing

By Alberto Bennardo, M. Pagano, S. Piccolo. 2009

159 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Finance, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/7f9b1d8990e2756910b058341a34f65866f333df

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

1. Tullio Jappelli
2. M. Pagano
3. Martin Brown
4. Anna Lusardi
5. Silvia Magri
6. C. Monticone
7. John Gathergood
8. E. Fornero

In Finance

1. Tullio Jappelli
2. Martin Brown
3. M. Pagano
4. Gregory F. Udell
5. Thorsten Beck
6. Alexander A. Popov
7. Vanessa S. Tchamyou

In Strategy and Management

1. M. Pagano

Citations in the corpus

• Public Information and Coordination: Evidence from a Credit Registry Expansion (2011, unknown): “…a¤ect debt of single lender rms if it reduces bank monitoring incentives (Petersen and Rajan (1995), Rajan (1992)), lowers rm reputational incentives (Padilla and Pagano (2000)), or reveals hidden rm debt (Parlour and Rajan (2001); Bisin and Guaitoli (2004); Bennardo, Pagano, and Piccolo (2009)).”
• Information Sharing and Credit: Firm-Level Evidence from Transition Countries (2009, background): “For instance, in the adverse selection model of Pagano and Jappelli (1993) the effect on lending is ambiguous, while it is positive in the hold-up model of Padilla and Pagano (1997) and in the multiple-bank lending model of Bennardo et al. (2007). The effect on lending also depends on the type of in”