Reputations, Relationships, and Contract Enforcement
By W. Macleod. 2007
428 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics, Safety Research
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/e54ff2fe8dcc9404860a283c5ba137671ef81a1e
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Accounting
- Wayne B. Thomas
- Ole‐Kristian Hope
- Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn
- Yiwei Dou
- Raymond E. Levitt
- W. Scott
- Simon Board
- W. Henisz
In Economics and Econometrics
- David Botchie
- Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn
- Wayne B. Thomas
- Yiwei Dou
- Raymond E. Levitt
- W. Scott
- Simon Board
- W. Henisz
In Safety Research
Citations in the corpus
- Relationship-Specificity, Contract Enforceability, and Income Smoothing (2013, background): “By maintaining long-term relationships with its suppliers, the firm receives a reputational “premium” (MacLeod 2007).”
- Contract Farming in Developing Countries: An overview (2008, positive): “The so-called reputation mechanism (MacLeod, 2007) means that parties have a calculative interest in cooperation in the current contract because they expect payoffs from future cooperative behaviour.”
- How to Pay Nonfamily Managers in Large Family Firms: A Principal—Agent Model (2011, neutral): “These results suggest that it can be advantageous to offer a fixed-wage contract to a nonfamily executive (Frey & Osterloh, 2005) or to rely on subjective performance evaluations or voluntary bonus payments(2) (Baker, Gibbons, & Murphy, 1994; Bushman et al., 1996; MacLeod, 2007; MacLeod & Malcomson,”
- Developing entrepreneurship in Africa: investigating critical resource challenges (2017, background): “Formal contract enforcement is a challenge in Africa (Macleod, 2007).”
- Incomplete Contracts and the Internal Organization of Firms (2013, neutral): “More generally on the importance of law and reputation on contract enforceability see MacLeod (2007).”
- Reputation for Quality (2013, methodology): “With imperfect learning, reputational incentives are hump-shaped, as in Benabou and Laroque (1992) and Mailath and Samuelson (2001).”
- Toward a unified theory of project governance: economic, sociological and psychological supports for relational contracting (2012, methodology): “Such models have long been used to model the incidence and utility of warranties, bonus pay, community enforcement and the investment in reputation (MacLeod, 2007).”