Strategic bidder behavior in sponsored search auctions
By Benjamin L. Edelman, Michael Ostrovsky. Decision Support Systems, 2007
307 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Management Science and Operations Research, Marketing, Strategy and Management
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/e4b0ab4fb559eb8e211867668ce130598cb6b699
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Management Science and Operations Research
- Ingemar Johansson Cox
- Vaclav Petricek
- T. Hayes
- Tilman Börgers
- Ilya Segal
- Martin Pesendorfer
- Przemyslaw Jeziorski
- Nikhil R. Devanur
In Marketing
- Ingemar Johansson Cox
- Vaclav Petricek
- Tilman Börgers
- Ilya Segal
- Martin Pesendorfer
- Przemyslaw Jeziorski
- Aranyak Mehta
- Jia Liu
In Strategy and Management
- Ingemar Johansson Cox
- Vaclav Petricek
- Tilman Börgers
- Ilya Segal
- Martin Pesendorfer
- Przemyslaw Jeziorski
- Jia Liu
- Olivier Toubia
Citations in the corpus
- The adwords problem: online keyword matching with budgeted bidders under random permutations (2009, background): “Some of the features that have been considered (or ignored) in the models [20, 8, 19, 16, 18, 4, 7, 17, 1, 9] include: online vs. offline or equilibrium properties, algorithm design vs mechanism design, single keyword vs multiple keywords, incorporating budgets or not, and pay per click vs pay per…”
- What Makes Them Click: Empirical Analysis of Consumer Demand for Search Advertising (2012, methodology): “Henceforth we will refer to this model as the “EOS model,” which is also used in Edelman and Ostrovsky (2007), Varian (2006), Yenmez (2009), Gomes and Sweeney (2009), Edelman and Schwarz (2010).”
- Understanding the paradigm shift to computational social science in the presence of big data (2014, unknown): “In addition, attention has been given to: controllable aspects of keyword auctions for keyword search mechanism design [26]; the application of historical information as an auction design aid [67]; strategic bidding behavior [39]; and re fi nement of Google and Yahoo!”
- Equilibrium Bids in Sponsored Search Auctions: Theory and Evidence (2013, methodology): “We then use the same Nash equilibrium refinement, “symmetric” Nash equilibria, that also Edelman et. al. and Varian used.”
- From Generic to Branded: A Model of Spillover Dynamics in Paid Search Advertising (2008, unknown): “Recent theoretical papers investigate paid search auction mechanisms (Edelman and Ostrovsky 2007, Edelman et al. 2007) and paid search advertising as a product differentiation game (Chen and He 2008). In related work, Wilbur and Zhu (2008) investigate click fraud in paid search auctions from a theor”