Reforming UK Airport Regulation

By D. Starkie. Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, 2001

159 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Michael Beesley (1999) was critical of the approach used in the UK to regulate its major airports. In the case of Heathrow, in particular, he argued that price-cap regulation was inappropriate. In this paper David Starkie, after examining some unusual economic characteristics of the airports industry, reaches a similar conclusion. He argues that the linking of complementary demands and location rents at major airports provides an incentive for dominant airports to increase their output beyond the level that one would expect from profit-maximising concerns providing only basic airport services. This incentive, together with recently enhanced competition law in the UK, is argued to make formal price control unnecessary.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/e41d6b79ee4fa90c8cbb9fbc36c41e0dc3796fff

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Citations in the corpus

Price-cap Regulation of Airports: Single-till Versus Dual-till (2006, background): “However, Starkie claims that there would be a lack of incentives for airports to exploit it [12].”
Congestible facility rivalry in vertical structures (2007, unknown): “For example, in the case of airports, it has often been argued that strategic collaboration between airports and airlines would solve the incentive and coordination problems regarding capacity and pricing in the vertical structure (see, e.g., Beesley, 1999; Forsyth, 1997; Starkie, 2001; for a more c”
Alternative Forms of Economic Regulation and their Efficiency Implications for Airports (2004, background): “This means that, as long as an airport provides both aviation services and retailing activities, its incentive will be to set airside user charges lower than if runways were a stand-alone facility, and thus, there may be no need to regulate its aviation user charges (Starkie, 2001).”
Airport Deregulation: Effects on Pricing and Capacity (2008, background): “This was in fact the maintained assumption of Zhang and Zhang (2003) and Oum et al.”
REVENUE SHARING WITH MULTIPLE AIRLINES AND AIRPORTS (2010, background): “Furthermore, commercial operations tend to be more profitable than aeronautical operations (e.g., Jones et al., 1993; Starkie, 2001; Francis et al., 2004), owing partly to prevailing regulations and charging mechanisms (e.g., Starkie, 2001).”