The Long-Run Benefits of Punishment

By Simon Gächter, E. Renner, Martin Sefton. Science, 2008

619 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Experimental and Cognitive Psychology, Safety Research, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/e3d9d44bbfa178b4082a7a2617dc39a29654fad5

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Experimental and Cognitive Psychology

In Safety Research

In Sociology and Political Science

Citations in the corpus

Gun for hire: Delegated enforcement and peer punishment in public goods provision (2012, methodology): “3 The punishment to cost ratio of 3:1 has been employed by many of the previous experiments (e.g. Fehr and Gachter, 2002; Gachter et al., 2008; Herrmann et al., 2008), while some others have employed a 4:1 ratio (Cinyabuguma et al.”
Saving Power to Conserve Your Reputation? The Effectiveness of Private versus Public Information (2012, positive): “Further research on this topic would be beneficial, particularly with regard to asymmetric responses between the two mechanisms and how these evolve over time (Gächter et al., 2008).”
Punishment Despite Reasonable Doubt - A Public Goods Experiment with Sanctions Under Uncertainty (2010, background): “Gächter et al. (2005) and Herrmann et al. (2008) show that the degree of such “antisocial punishment” is decisive with respect to the efficiency of the punishment mechanism in establishing cooperative results.”
How to learn about teaching: An evolutionary framework for the study of teaching behavior in humans and other animals. (2014, background): “” This fits the more commonly used definition of punishment (as well as seems to encompass the former notion of “training”) in which the costs of punishment dramatically reduce payoffs in the short run, especially for the punisher, but not in the long run (Fehr & Gächter 2002; Gächter et al. 2008; M”
Sustaining cooperation in laboratory public goods experiments: a selective survey of the literature (2011, background): “And at times, given a long enough time horizon, as in Gächter et al. (2008), the threat of punishment might be enough to sustain cooperation without the punishment actually having to be carried out.28 The second problem has to do with the issue of “anti-social” punishments as discussed in Sect.”
The limits of self-governance when cooperators get punished: Experimental evidence from urban and rural Russia (2011, neutral): “, Henrich and Boyd (1998)).”