Modes of Communication

By Mathias Dewatripont, Jean Tirole. Journal of Political Economy, 2005

327 citations recorded by the source corpus.

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Optimal Dissent in Organizations (2009, background): “What is important here is that selection and implementation effort are at least weak complements in the production function (see also Dewatripont and Tirole [2005] for a similar assumption).”
Social Learning and Incentives for Experimentation and Communication (2018, background): “Our work relates to the theoretical literature on incentives for communication of non-verifiable information (beginning with Crawford and Sobel, 1982) and verifiable information requiring effort on the part of senders and receivers (Dewatripont and Tirole, 2005).”
The Impact of Incentives and Communication Costs on Information Production and Use: Evidence from Bank Lending: Impact of Incentives and Communication Costs on Information (2015, unknown): “…agents may have biases or different preferences when sending and interpreting information, that is, there are frictions in the communication and decision-making processes (e.g., Crawford and Sobel (1982), Radner (1993), Bolton and Dewatripont (1994), Garicano (2000), Dewatripont and Tirole (2005)).”
Cognition and Incomplete Contracts (2009, background): “9 As in Mathias Dewatripont and Tirole (2005), for example, the cost of cognition is depicted as a sampling cost.”
Communication and influence (2015, background): “Dewatripont and Tirole (2005) analyze a model of endogenous costly communication between a sender and a receiver.”