Communication and influence
By Antoni Calvó-Armengol, Joan de Martí, Andrea Prat. 2015
83 citations recorded by the source corpus.
We study the information flows that arise among a set of agents with local knowledge and directed payoff interactions, which differ among pairs of agents. First, we study the equilibrium of a game where, before making decisions, agents can invest in pairwise active communication (speaking) and pairwise passive communication (listening). This leads to a full characterization of information and influence flows. Second, we show that, when the coordination motive dominates the adaptation motive, the influence of an agent on all his peers is approximately proportional to his eigenvector centrality. Third, we use our results to explain organizational phenomena such as: the emergence of work cliques; the adoption of human resources practices that foster communication (especially active communication); and the discrepancy between formal hierarchy and actual influence.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research, Safety Research
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/d19e0707321f4a5b1ab8975ad652009a7e3437bc
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In Economics and Econometrics
In Management Science and Operations Research
In Safety Research
Citations in the corpus
- Bayesian Nash equilibrium and variational inequalities (2016, methodology): “We can use this result to study Bayesian network games with random adjacency matrices, whereas most previous studies on Bayesian network games assume a constant adjacency matrix with a special structure (Blume et al., 2015; de Martì and Zenou, 2015; Calvó-Armengol et al., 2015).”