Small feedback‐based decisions and their limited correspondence to description‐based decisions

By Greg Barron, Ido Erev. 2003

715 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, General Decision Sciences, Management Science and Operations Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/e2f6b2db039b09a427d42e3a7684adf4ddaedc1c

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Citations in the corpus

Response to Travel Information: A Behavioural Review (2015, background): “Framing and loss aversion Kahneman and Tversky (1979, 1984), Barron and Erev (2003), Kahneman et al. (1991), Erev et al. (2008),”
Decisions From Experience and Statistical Probabilities: Why They Trigger Different Choices Than a Priori Probabilities (2010, background): “To conclude, we found a large description–experience gap, and thereby observed choices that are consistent with the thesis that rare events have more impact in description-based than in experience-based choices, as suggested by Barron and Erev (2003) , Hertwig et al. (2004), and Weber et al. (2004)”
Biased samples not mode of presentation: Re-examining the apparent underweighting of rare events in experience-based choice (2008, methodology): “Barron and Erev (2003) observed this using a ‘‘money-machine” paradigm.”
Data collection in a flat world: the strengths and weaknesses of mechanical turk samples (2013, background): “…to money and payoffs, participants initially responded to four risky choice prospects, adapted from previous research, testing risk aversion for gains, risk-seeking for losses, and the certainty effect (Barron & Erev, 2003; Hertwig et al., 2004; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992).”
The Experience of Consensus: Video as an Effective Medium to Communicate Scientific Agreement on Climate Change (2019, background): “…Harris, Sildmäe, Speekenbrink, and Hahn (2018) note the now-infamous distinction between describing versus experiencing probabilistic statements (Barron & Erev, 2003), with the implication that people may underestimate the scientific consensus when described rather than experienced (Harris et…”
The Description-Experience Gap in Risky Choice: The Role of Sample Size and Experienced Probabilities (2008, methodology): “(2004), which in turn represent a subset of those used by Barron and Erev (2003). Having established— using this small set of problems—that the description–experience gap is not eliminated when people draw on large samples, one task ahead is to examine how robust and large the gap is across a wider ”
Loss aversion, diminishing sensitivity, and the effect of experience on repeated decisions† (2008, methodology): “Whereas Thaler et al. (1997; and see Barron & Erev, 2003) found deviations from maximization that can be explained by the loss aversion hypothesis, the results reported by Katz (1964) show no evidence of loss aversion.”
Learning, risk attitude and hot stoves in restless bandit problems (2009, background): “…(i.e., a tendency to act more randomly with an increase in payoff variability, see Busemeyer and Townsend (1993) andMyers and Sadler (1960)), underweighting of small probabilities (a tendency to neglect infrequent outcomes, see Barron and Erev (2003)), and the hot stove effect considered above.”
The effect of foregone payoffs on underweighting small probability events (2006, background): “When the payoff environment has strong local optima, without foregone payoffs intuitive exploration may to converge in local optima (see Yechiam, Erev & Gopher, 2001; Erev & Barron, 2005).”
Learning and the Economics of Small Decisions (2013, background): “Underweighting of rare events and the experience-description gap Barron and Erev (2003) compared repeated decisions from experience (in the clicking paradigm without forgone payoff) with one-shot decisions that are made based on precise description of the payoff distributions (as in the situations a”
Loss Averse Behavior (2005, neutral): “…loss lotteries, mixed lotteries are used to extract evidence for particular functional forms of the utility function (Fennema and van Assen, 1999; Barron and Erev, 2003; Bleichrodt, Pinto, and Wakker, 2001; Abdellaoui, Vossmann, and Weber, 2005; Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt and Paraschiv, 2004) or the…”
The role of experience in the Gambler's Fallacy (2010, background): “Barron and Erev (2003) demonstrate that the deviations from maximization that one observes in choices between lotteries depend critically on how the information was acquired (i.e., through a description or through experience).”
On the difficulty of promoting workers' safety behaviour: overcoming the underweighting of routine risks (2007, background): “This ratio encourages safety-rule violations because people tend to overweight recent outcomes when choosing among action alternatives, otherwise known as recency bias (Barron and Erev, 2003).”