Corporate Governance Proposals and Shareholder Activism: The Role of Institutional Investors

By Stuart L. Gillan, Laura T. Starks. 2000

1,679 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/e280461ba5d7f621b86174d2678f148f946b1547

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Citations in the corpus

Institutional Investors and Mutual Fund Governance: Evidence from Retail – Institutional Fund Twins (2012, background): “…(2003)) or directly via active monitoring (e.g., adoption of anti-takeover provisions (Agrawal and Mandelker (1990)), CEO compensation (Hartzell and Starks (2003), and Almazan, Hartzell, and Starks (2005)), or proxy voting (Gillan and Starks (2000), and Del Guercio, Seery, and Woidtke (2008)).”
Investor Activism and Takeovers (2009, background): “While blockholdings are widespread, there is virtually no evidence that institutional shareholders are effective monitors, or that their presence in the capital structure increases firm 2 value.”
Do Index Funds Monitor? (2021, methodology): “First, we split agenda items into shareholder proposals and management proposals (Gillan and Starks (2000)).”
Institutional investor cliques and governance (2019, positive): “Consistent with this, results in Gillan and Starks (2000) suggest that coordinated voting can impact governance outcomes.”
Board interlocks and the diffusion of disclosure policy (2014, neutral): “Houston et al. (2010) also find that poor performance is the main reason for quarterly earnings guidance cessation.”
Investor Horizons and Corporate Policies (2013, neutral): “For details, see Carleton, Nelson, and Weisbach (1998), Del Guercio and Hawkins (1999), and Gillan and Starks (2000).”
Ownership structures and R&D in Europe: the good institutional investors, the bad and ugly impatient shareholders (2013, background): “One mechanism that has really affected the monitoring of companies is the emergence of institutional investors (Gillian and Starks, 2000): institutional investors, as large blockholders, can influence managers either through internal mechanism of governance (board of directors or manager compensatio”
The Structure of Debt and Active Equity Investors: The Case of The Buyout Specialist (2001, background): “Others have found that public pension funds pressure management into changing corporate governance structures or restructuring assets (see Romano, 1993; Murphy and Van Nuys, 1994; Wahal, 1996; Karpoff et al., 1996; Gillan and Starks, 1998; Del Guercio and Hawkins, 1999).”
Educational Networks, Mutual Fund Voting Patterns, and CEO Compensation (2012, neutral): “Gillan and Starks (2000) present evidence that voting outcomes are related to the proposal sponsor’s identity, issue type, prior performance, and time period.”
The Complementarity between Corporate Governance and Corporate Social Responsibility (2005, neutral): “15 Gillan and Starks (1998, 2000).”
The Impact of Institutional Ownership on Corporate Operating Performance (2007, positive): “Our measures of institutional investor ownership follow those used in Hartzell and Starks (2002). We calculate both the proportion of total institutional investor ownership and the proportion of ownership accounted for by the top five institutional investors in each firm.”
The Effect of Institutional Ownership on Firm Transparency and Information Production (2015, positive): “This distinction is important because institutional investors have diverse investment and trading strategies, potentially leading to a differential impact on firm polices, information production, and the trading environment (Gillan and Starks, 2000; Bushee and Noe, 2000).”