Educational Networks, Mutual Fund Voting Patterns, and CEO Compensation

By Alexander W. Butler, Umit G. Gurun. 2012

135 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/269f213c77517f87d868bd35d6ece728b3300e6f

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

1. David H. Solomon
2. Eugene F. Soltes
3. D. Sosyura
4. Kenneth R. Ahern
5. James Vincent
6. Marcus P. Kirk

In Economics and Econometrics

1. David H. Solomon
2. Eugene F. Soltes

In Finance

1. Eugene F. Soltes
2. David H. Solomon
3. D. Sosyura
4. Kenneth R. Ahern
5. James Vincent
6. Marcus P. Kirk

Citations in the corpus

• Institutional investor cliques and governance (2019, unknown): “While Del Guercio and Hawkins (1999) and Davis and Kim (2007) suggest conflicts of interest are not a problem generally, Butler and Gurun (2012) show that coordination in voting can arise when fund managers”
• What Are We Meeting For? The Consequences of Private Meetings with Investors (2015, background): “The firm may still be inadvertently disclosing such information, but it militates against the possibility of management having a quid pro quo arrangement with hedge funds to disclose material information (see, for example, Butler and Gurun 2012).”