The Structure of Debt and Active Equity Investors: The Case of The Buyout Specialist
By J. Cotter, Sarah W. Peck. 2001
206 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Finance
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/bd8a1fdc581bfa5b587aa79839cf217724980c20
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Citations in the corpus
- Venture Capital and Other Private Equity: A Survey (2011, unknown): “4 Also see (Kaplan 1991), (Cotter and Peck 2001), (Denis 1992), (Lehn et al.”
- The Evolution of Capital Structure and Operating Performance after Leveraged Buyouts: Evidence from U.S. Corporate Tax Returns (2014, background): “equity firms have experience with monitoring LBO firms and are considered ‘active investors’ (Kaplan, 1991; Cotter and Peck, 2001).”
- The impact of corporate governance mechanisms on value increase in leveraged buyouts (2007, unknown): “Lehn and Poulsen (1989), Kaplan (1989), Smith (1990), Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1990), Cotter and Peck (2001) and Bruton et al. (2002) find that increased leverage and realignment of incentives have positive effects on the operating performance of leveraged buyout companies. provide evidence of…”
- Agency, Strategic Entrepreneurship, and the Performance of Private Equity–Backed Buyouts (2009, unknown): “Additionally, more experienced investors will have access to more flexible debt arrangements (Cotter & Peck, 2001) which allow the buyout firm to take on more risky projects in order to realize growth opportunities.”
- Earnings Quality and Ownership Structure: The Role of Private Equity Sponsors (2009, unknown): “PE sponsors can actively monitor and motivate management by virtue of their board membership (Cotter and Peck 2001; Gompers 1995; Lerner 1995; Renneboog and Simons 2005).”
- Partner Selection Decisions in Interfirm Collaborations: The Paradox of Relational Embeddedness (2010, background): “Second, PE firms play an important role in monitoring portfolio companies to reduce informational asymmetries for both early stage (Gompers, 1995; Kaplan and Strömberg, 2004) and later stage buyout investments (Cotter and Peck, 2001).”
- Why do public firms go private in the UK? The impact of private equity investors, incentive realignment and undervaluation (2007, background): “The stick appears when firms borrow heavily in order to effect this incentive alignment, which forces the managers to efficiently run the company to avoid default (Cotter and Peck, 2001).”
- Private Equity, Leveraged Buyouts and Governance (2007, unknown): “firm (Cotter and Peck, 2001).”
- The Desire to Acquire and IPO Long-Run Underperformance (2012, methodology): “Finally, following Cotter and Peck (2001) and Purnanandan and Swaminathan (2004) we use the IPO firm's sales (Sales) from the Compustat database, as reported on the first available annual”