Reconstructing the Cognitive World: The Next Step

By M. Wheeler. 2005

448 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/e25eb7e69d2213374133274ad970aaab5f990d10

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Citations in the corpus

The psychology of memory, extended cognition, and socially distributed remembering (2010, background): “Indeed, in our view the study of extended cognitive systems naturally emerges from and relies on basic research in cognitive psychology and related areas of the cognitive sciences (compare Wilson 1994, 2004; Clark 1997, 2008; Rowlands 1999, 2010; Sutton 2004; Wheeler 2005; Menary 2007).”
First-Order Languaging Dynamics and Second-Order Language: The Distributed Language View (2011, background): “The notion that brains operate on internal symbolic representations is no longer accepted by a growing number of researchers (Clark, 1997; Goldfield, 1993; Hutchins, 1995; Wheeler, 2005).”
Merging second-person and first-person neuroscience (2013, unknown): “Moreover, the general idea of the enactive approach, namely that cognition is an activity of the whole organism, is compatible with an explanatory framework that makes use of mental representations, even if these have to be understood in a more action-oriented sense (Clark 2001; Wheeler 2005).”
Attacking the Bounds of Cognition (2006, background): “However, I am working under the assumption that examples of hybridity and the complementary dance of internal and external processes have been quite fully described in other sources (Clark, 1997; Hutchins, 1995; Menary, in press; Rowlands, 1999; Wheeler, 2005).”
Defining Agency: Individuality, Normativity, Asymmetry, and Spatio-temporality in Action (2009, background): “By abstract- ing away some specific details of minimal models of living agency we define the kind of organization that is capable of meeting the required conditions for agency (which is not restricted to living organ- isms).”
Dimensions of mind (2010, background): “There is no magic at work here (see the muggle constraint in Wheeler 2005 ).”
Beads for a Plastic Mind: the ‘Blind Man's Stick’ (BMS) Hypothesis and the Active Nature of Material Culture (2008, background): “The temptation to use all these rapidly accumulating neuroscientific resources for firmly situating the human mind inside the head should be resisted, I believe, for obvious reasons: human cognition, as archaeology ought to know better than any other discipline, needs more than a brain (Hutchins 199”
Sensorimotor intentionality: The origins of intentionality in prospective agent action (2013, background): “Our proposal is in line with a growing body of literature that proposes a continuity between the agent’s sensorimotor interactions in the immediate present and the development of higher-order cognitive processes, such as memory and representational capacities (e.g. Clark, 1997; Haggard et al., 2008;”
Enactive artificial intelligence: Investigating the systemic organization of life and mind (2009, methodology): “…by this research are equally informative for other cognitive science that is also embodied, embedded and dynamical but not grounded in constitutive autonomy (e.g. Wheeler 2005; Clark 1997), this is strictly speaking still not fully enactive AI according to the criteria we outlined previously.”
Extended, Embodied Cognition and Second Language Acquisition (2010, background): “First, rather than having evolved to address the abstract, logic-like problems of cognitivism, cognition is first and foremost flexible, on-line adaptive intelligence (Wheeler 2005).”