Are Small Investors Naive About Incentives

By Ulrike Malmendier, Devin M. Shanthikumar. 2007

547 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/e15a3cff0cc2ddc113c311970dbdc74b5e4f9387

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Citations in the corpus

Who Uses Financial Reports and for What Purpose? Evidence from Capital Providers (2014, unknown): “Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2007) report that retail investors fail to adjust bias in analysts’ recommendations.”
When Sunlight Fails to Disinfect: Understanding the Perverse Effects of Disclosing Conflicts of Interest (2011, background): “…a simple form, disclosure is likely to prove helpful when the recipients are savvy repeat-players who know what to do with the disclosed information, such as institutional investors, experienced attorneys, or managers in government agencies (Church and Kuang 2009; Malmendier and Shanthikumar 2007).”
Persuasion: Empirical Evidence (2010, unknown): “Consistent with Malmendier & Shanthikumar (2007), they show that individual investors buy in response to the optimistically biased recommendations.”
Signaling in Equity Crowdfunding (2015, unknown): “Corporate finance literature defines small investors as those who (1) invest relatively small amounts of money, and (2) receive a relatively small stake of a company in return (e.g., Malmendier & Shanthikumar, 2007).”
How (not) to pay for advice: A framework for consumer financial protection ☆ (2012, unknown): “The form of naiveté about incentives that we posit is similar to the one documented empirically by Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2007) in the context of recommendations made by security analysts to investors.”
Analyzing Analyst Research: A Review of Past Coverage and Recommendations for Future Research (2018, background): “Cases of overly optimistic stock recommendations by analysts, for example, have prompted strong critiques (Jegadeesh, Kim, Krische, & Lee 2004; Malmendier & Shanthikumar, 2007).13 However, despite these inherent conflicts of interest, analysts also serve as an important external monitor.”