Big Bills Left on the Sidewalk: Why Some Nations are Rich

By M. Olson. 2000

460 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/e02a56c21b6ec5f23697184754836172d536e7db

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In Economics and Econometrics

Citations in the corpus

Terrorism: The relevance of the rational choice model (2006, background): “While this is an oversimplification (McGuire & Olson, 1996), it is a plausible prediction if your opponent is a rational maximizer of wealth or power.”
The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead (2000, background): “Institutions at this level change very slowly—on the order of centuries or millennia—whereupon Douglass North poses the query, “What is it about informal constraints that gives them such a pervasive influence upon the long-run character of economies?””
Entrepreneurship and regional competitiveness: The role and progression of policy (2011, background): “However, despite its importance to regional economic development, what constitutes culture is often vague (Olson 1996).”
Which country matters? Institutional development and foreign affiliate performance (2008, background): “…national economic growth (Barro, 1991; Hall and Jones, 1999; Knack and Keefer, 1997; Krueger and Lindahl, 2001; La Porta et al., 1997; North, 1990; Olson, 1996; Williamson, 1985) and the profitability of engaging in business activities (Khanna and Rivkin, 2001; North, 1990), research is needed to…”
Getting Income Shares Right (2002, unknown): “6 For instance, Olson (1996) argues that economic performance may differ markedly across borders precisely because of differences in institutions. income shares 463 the owners of capital.”
Institutional Entrepreneurship (2006, background): “In the real world, entrepreneurs make this trade-off all the time, as powerfully shown in studies of countries with only partially developed legal frameworks, such as Peru (de Soto, 2000) and in cross-country comparisons (Olson, 1996; Kreft and Sobel, 2005).”
Home country institutions and the internationalization of state owned enterprises: A cross-country analysis (2016, background): “Formal institutions are the foundation for the efficiency of markets as they enable for the exchange of information among actors, the monitoring of behavior, and the sanctioning of defection from cooperative endeavor (North, 1990; Olson 1996).”
The Extralegal Development of Securities Trading in Seventeenth Century Amsterdam (2003, background): “Likewise,Olson (1996)believes that some trades can take place without external enforcement 65 but not complicated financial transactions.”
Rational Ignorance versus Rational Irrationality (2001, background): “Political economy has reached an impasse: the theoretical case for the efficiency of political markets (Becker 1976a, Wittman 1989, 1995) seems impossible to reconcile with the empirical and intuitive case for political failure (e.g., Olson 1996, Shleifer 1998).”
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GOOD GOVERNANCE AND CARBON DIOXIDE EMISSIONS: EVIDENCE FROM DEVELOPING ECONOMIES (2012, background): “While the industrialized countries seem to have achieved most of their potential in good governance (Olson, 1996), the developing countries still lag behind.”