Contracting, signaling, and moral hazard: a model of entrepreneurs, 'angels,' and venture capitalists

By Ramy Elitzur, Arieh Gavious. 2003

298 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Management of Technology and Innovation

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/df43b8c18ae5a2bedb2a93ab42b08258618fca7f

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In Management of Technology and Innovation

Citations in the corpus

Ownership as a Form of Corporate Governance (2010, unknown): “Research indicates, for example, that relationships with prestigious venture capitalists or investment bankers may influence investor decision making (Elitzur and Gavious, 2003; Megginson and Weiss, 1991).”
A comparison of the effect of angels and venture capitalists on innovation and value creation (2016, background): “of technology development (OECD, 2011; Elitzur and Gavious, 2003).”
Quality Signals? The Role of Patents, Alliances, and Team Experience in Venture Capital Financing (2015, unknown): “Analyzing a sample of German ventures, Engel and Keilbach (2007) notice that venture capital-funded firms hold a larger number of patent applications at pre-funding stage than non-venture capital-funded firms.”
Information asymmetries, agency costs and venture capital exit outcomes (2008, unknown): “Prior work has also shown common equity typically carries with it fewer contractual veto and control rights apart from the security itself (for theoretical work, see Bergmann and Hege 1998 ; Trester 1998 ; Cestone 2002 ; Casamatta 2003 ; Schmidt 2003 ; Elitzur and Gavious 2003 ; Hellmann 1998”
Financing entrepreneurship: Bank finance versus venture capital (2007, background): “Elitzur and Gavious (2003b) highlight the importance of “angels” as seed investors in startups and the moral hazard issues that arise from their interaction with entrepreneurs and venture capitalists.”
‘I Like How You Think’: Similarity as an Interaction Bias in the Investor–Entrepreneur Dyad (2011, unknown): “…(1) the probability the VC would be likely to invest in the opportunity (Riquelme and Rickards, 1992), (2) the amount of money the VC would be likely to invest (Elitzur and Gavious, 2003), and (3) how successful the VC thought the opportunity would be (Muzyka et al., 1996; Shepherd et al., 2000).”
Signaling Theory: A Review and Assessment (2011, background): “…on the other hand, focus almost exclusively on the leaders of start-up and IPO firms as signalers (Bruton, Chahine, & Filatotchev, 2009; Zimmerman, 2008), although some work examines the signaling that occurs by franchisors (Michael, 2009) and individual entrepreneurs (Elitzur & Gavious, 2003).”
Founder's human capital, external investment, and the survival of new high-technology ventures (2010, background): “…third party introducer (Hall nd Hofer, 1993); social status (Shane and Khurana, 2003, p. 20), strategic partners (Stuart et al., 1999) top management ffiliations (Higgins and Gulati, 2006), other respected investors Elitzur and Gavious, 2003) or affiliated distinguished individuals Hsu, 2007).”
An entrepreneur's choice of venture capitalist or angel-financing: A behavioral game-theoretic approach (2011, background): “” Furthermore, according to Elitzur and Gavious (2003), angels may be relatives of the entrepreneur, or former successful entrepreneurs from the same industry, seeking to help similar new companies. We use this observation to motivate our assumption that angels and entrepreneurs may enjoy closer and”
Entrepreneurial ecosystem governance: a principal investigator-centered governance framework (2019, background): “Entrepreneurs could for example use their personal networks and strong ties to business angels to signal their good reputation to get funding (Elitzur and Gavious 2003), and funding agencies could, for example, install a simple monitoring system for the PI such as a quarterly reporting system.”
A Review and Road Map of Entrepreneurial Equity Financing Research: Venture Capital, Corporate Venture Capital, Angel Investment, Crowdfunding, and Accelerators (2017, background): “Drover et al. / Equity Financing Review 1827 Elitzur and Gavious (2003) modeled moral hazard issues that arise as entrepreneurs, angels, and venture capitalists interact.”