Payment Systems and Interchange Fees

By R. Schmalensee. 2003

298 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Finance, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/dca977c2a0d247d1bcfa90afbf2951aa095fb633

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Citations in the corpus

MUST-TAKE CARDS: MERCHANT DISCOUNTS AND AVOIDED COSTS (2011, methodology): “Our analysis of merchant heterogeneity borrows from Schmalensee (2002) and Wright (2004).”
The Economics of Credit Cards, Debit Cards and Atms: A Survey and Some New Evidence (2008, unknown): “Schmalensee (2002) argues that a remarkable aspect of his model is that under imperfect competition, the privately optimal interchange fee set by the banks also maximizes social welfare (as conventionally defined).”
Theory of Credit Card Networks: A Survey of the Literature (2003, unknown): “28 See Chang, Evans, and Schmalensee (1998) and Evans and Schmalensee (1995) for further discussion.”
Access Pricing Under Competition: An Application to Cellular Networks (2003, unknown): “interchange fee, and where both cardholder and merchant demand matters, Schmalensee [2001] and”
Two-Sided Markets: A Tentative Survey (2005, background): “Contributions come from, among others, Gans and King (2003), Katz (2001), Rochet and Tirole (2002), Schmalensee (2002) , Wright (2003a; 2003b; and 2004).”
An Empirical Analysis of Payment Card Usage (2007, background): “I argue that my results suggest several implications: the presence of an interchange fee, the fact that the fee is set by the card association rather than the bank and the fact that it is set so that merchants subsidize consumers.”
The Determinants of Optimal Interchange Fees in Payment Systems (2004, unknown): “12Schmalensee [2002] considers the possibility that issuers will have greater bargaining power than acquirers.”
Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets: The Case of Payment Networks (2006, background): “…prices including interchange fees, merchant discounts, and retail prices of goods and services within a single payment platform (see Chakravorti and Emmons (2003), Chakravorti and To (2003), Rochet and Tirole (2002), Schmalensee (2002), Schwartz and Vincent (2002), Wright (2003) and Wright (2004)).”
Platform Intermediation in a Market for Differentiated Products (2009, unknown): “A great deal of this literature has focused on specific markets, most notably credit card markets (see Rochet and Tirole (2002), Schmalensee (2002) and Wright (2003, 2004)), the Internet (see Baye and Morgan (2001) and Caillaud and Jullien (2001, 2003)), commercial media markets (see Anderson and…”
The economics of mobile payments: Understanding stakeholder issues for an emerging financial technology application (2008, background): “These are known as interchange fees in ﬁnancial services, especially in the credit card market [21,39,40] and the ATM banking services market [90,91,207,209,214].”
Consumer payment choice: Merchant card acceptance versus pricing incentives (2015, background): “Theoretical models underscore the key role of price elasticities in determining the final pricing, see Schmalensee (2002), Rochet and Tirole (2002) and Wright (2003).”
Merchant or Two-Sided Platform? (2007, unknown): “Jullien (2003), Evans (2003), Hagiu (2006a) and (2006b), Rochet and Tirole (2003) and (2006), Schmalensee (2002)).”
Platform competition in two sided markets (2003, methodology): “…on chickenand-egg problems.4 This literature however assumes either that there is a monopoly platform (Baye and Morgan 2001, Rochet and Tirole 2002, Schmalensee 2002) or that platforms are fully interconnected (Laffont, Marcus, Rey, Tirole 2003) and so end-users enjoy the same level of…”