The Determinants of Optimal Interchange Fees in Payment Systems

By Julian Wright. 2004

243 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Finance, Media Technology, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/73c18c8fab8e851fe78de6d5956c69134fe7d04c

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Finance

In Media Technology

In Strategy and Management

Citations in the corpus

Optimal Card Payment Systems (2002, background): “Frankel (1998) provides arguments why interchange fees should be set at zero, while Small and Wright (2001) analyze what would happen in the existing credit card schemes if interchange fees have to be set bilaterally.”
An Empirical Analysis of Payment Card Usage (2007, unknown): “Schmalensee (2002), Wright (2002), Caillaud and Julien (2003) and particularly Rochet and Tirole (2002, 2003) are important recent contributions.”
Price Coherence and Excessive Intermediation (2015, background): “Articles in the payment literature that share these features include Rochet 5 and Tirole (2002, 2011), Wright (2004, 2012), Farrell (2006), and Guthrie and Wright (2007).”
Two-Sided Markets: A Tentative Survey (2005, background): “Contributi ons come from, among others, Gans and King (2003), Katz (2001), Rochet and Tirole (2002), Schmalensee (2002), Wright (2003a; 2003b; and 2004) .”
A Price Theory of Multi-Sided Platforms (2010, unknown): “While “micro” models that directly incorporate such interactions (Julian Wright 2004, Andrei Hagiu 2006, Graeme Guthrie and Julian Wright 2007) have similar positive forms, their normative implications can be quite different.”
Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets: The Case of Payment Networks (2006, background): “…prices including interchange fees, merchant discounts, and retail prices of goods and services within a single payment platform (see Chakravorti and Emmons (2003), Chakravorti and To (2003), Rochet and Tirole (2002), Schmalensee (2002), Schwartz and Vincent (2002), Wright (2003) and Wright (2004)).”
One-sided Logic in Two-sided Markets (2004, unknown): “Provided it is consistent with merchants’ accepting cards, the right price signal is given at the Baxter interchange fee (or its generalization in Wright, 2004 to the case where different merchants have different benefits of accepting cards).”
Theory of Credit Card Networks: A Survey of the Literature (2003, unknown): “Small, J. and J. Wright (2001) “The bilateral negotiation of interchange fees in payment schemes,” mimeo, NECG and University of Auckland.”
MUST-TAKE CARDS: MERCHANT DISCOUNTS AND AVOIDED COSTS (2011, methodology): “Following Wright (2004), we assume that the retail sector consists in a continuum of subsectors, each corresponding to a value of bS.”
Platform Intermediation in a Market for Differentiated Products (2009, background): “…deal of this literature has focused on specific markets, most notably credit card markets (see Rochet and Tirole (2002), Schmalensee (2002) and Wright (2003, 2004)), the Internet (see Baye and Morgan (2001) and Caillaud and Jullien (2001, 2003)), commercial media markets (see Anderson and…”