Optimal Long-Term Financial Contracting

By Peter M. DeMarzo, Michael J. Fishman. 2007

458 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/db8e22569bafb407d071d345cde1f5491f7a2620

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Citations in the corpus

Optimal Mortgage Design (2010, unknown): “Our model is a generalization of that by DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006) and DeMarzo and Fishman (2007a). The major di¤erence is that the lenders cost of capital is stochastic.”
Calibrated Incentive Contracts (2013, unknown): “…Rogerson (1985), Green (1987), Holmström and Milgrom (1987), Spear and Srivastava (1987), Laffont and Tirole (1988), and more recently Battaglini (2005), DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006), Biais et al. (2007, 2010), DeMarzo and Fishman (2007), Sannikov (2008), Edmans et al. (forthcoming) or Zhu (2010)).”
Optimal securitization with moral hazard (2012, background): “Other work that considers a security design in the context of a moral hazard framework include DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006) and DeMarzo and Fishman (2007), which both consider long term contracts for repeated agency conflicts in which actions have short term consequences.”
The Role of Dynamic Renegotiation and Asymmetric Information in Financial Contracting (2015, unknown): “of Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006), DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006), DeMarzo and Fishman (2007), and Biais, Mariotti, Rochet, and Villeneuve (2010) produce long-term contracts that are susceptible to renegotiation because of the inefficiency of the punishment — e.”
A Model of Dynamic Compensation and Capital Structure (2011, methodology): “DeMarzo and Fishman (2007), DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006), and Biais, Mariotti, Plantin, and Rochet (2007) solve a dynamic contracting problem with a risk-neutral agent, in which the limited liability restriction is imposed.”
Human Capital, Bankruptcy and Capital Structure (2007, unknown): “DeMarzo and Fishman (2006) derive the optimal labor contract in a similar moral hazard setting and show that it requires the firm to issued debt. e need to review entrenchment literature properly —”
CEO Turnover in a Competitive Assignment Framework (2013, unknown): “In particular, managers 8See for example, DeMarzo and Fishman (2007a), DeMarzo and Fishman (2007b), He (2007), DeMarzo, Fishman, He, and Wang (2009), He (2009), Sannikov (2008), and Lustig, Syverson, and Van Nieuwerburgh (2009).”
Aggregate Risk and the Choice between Cash and Lines of Credit (2010, unknown): “, Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (1999), Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2004, 2009), and Duchin (2009)). Recent work also shows that bank lines of credit have become an important source of rm nancing (Su (2009) and Disatnik, Duchin, and Schmidt (2010)). The available evidence further s”
Large risks, limited liability, and dynamic moral hazard (2010, methodology): “the total number of losses, which is equal to 0 or 1. Equations (10) and ( 12 ) imply that the”
Dividend Stickiness and Strategic Pooling (2010, unknown): “DeMarzo and Fishman (2007) show in a dynamic setting that with privately observed cash flows and investment, both equity and debt are optimally used in the agent's compensation.”
Dynamic Investment, Capital Structure, and Debt Overhang (2015, unknown): “We have also seen a fast growing dynamic financial contracting literature, including DeMarzo and Fishman (2007), DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006), and DeMarzo and others (2012).”
Collateral and Capital Structure (2009, background): “Capital structure dynamics subject to similar incentive problems but abstracting from investment decisions are analyzed by DeMarzo and Fishman (2007b), DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006), and Biais, Mariotti, Plantin, and Rochet (2007).3 In these models, collateral plays no role.”