Optimal Mortgage Design
By Tomasz Piskorski, Alexei Tchistyi. 2010
216 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Demography, Economics and Econometrics
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/2762e7614762be260bd2f7a43495adc0c2a1568a
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Citations in the corpus
- Financial Literacy, Present Bias and Alternative Mortgage Products (2017, unknown): “For example, in our data there are no instances of individuals holding both SMPs and AMPs, in contrast to the US market (Mayer et al., 2009).”
- Mortgage Design in an Equilibrium Model of the Housing Market (2018, unknown): “Beyond these three closely related papers, Piskorski and Tchistyi (2010, 2011) consider mortgage design from an optimal contracting perspective and find that the optimal mortgage looks like an option ARM when interest rates are stochastic and a subprime loan when house prices are stochastic. Brueckn”
- A Model of Mortgage Default (2015, unknown): “A Model of Mortgage Default The Harvard community has made this article openly available.”
- Asset Quality Misrepresentation by Financial Intermediaries: Evidence from RMBS Market (2013, unknown): “It is worth noting that though such repurchase clauses were common in the market during 2005 and 2006, actual enforcement of these contracts was not as strict (see Piskorski et al. 2010).”
- Asset Quality Misrepresentation by Financial Intermediaries: Evidence from the RMBS Market: Asset Quality Misrepresentation by Financial Intermediaries (2015, unknown): “12 See Piskorski and Tchistyi (2010) and Amromin et al. (2011) for a discussion of option adjustable rate mortgages.”
- Monetary Policy Pass-Through: Household Consumption and Voluntary Deleveraging (2014, background): “(2013), Scharfstein and Sunderam (2013) and Keys et al.”
- Mortgage Rates, Household Balance Sheets, and the Real Economy (2014, unknown): “Third, by automatically reducing mortgage rates, ARMs may help alleviate the barriers to loan renegotiation due to securitization (Piskorski et al. 2010; Agarwal et al. 2011) and lender concerns regarding borrowers’ strategic behavior (Mayer et al. 2014).”
- Mortgage Market Design (2012, background): “In an environment with fully rational and time-consistent borrowers and lenders, and no foreclosure externalities, this structure can be a good approximation to the solution of an optimal dynamic contracting problem (Piskorski and Tchistyi 2010, 2011).”
- Chapter 21 - Household Finance: An Emerging Field∗ (2013, unknown): “35 While we focus on these explanations, others have also been proposed. Following Merton (1987), Guiso and Jappelli (2005) argue that lack of awareness may explain why some (especially among the poor) do not invest in these assets.”
- Dynamic Agency and the q Theory of Investment (2012, background): “Proposition 3 With state n; the agents continuation payo¤ evolves according to (34) until wt = 0 and the contract is terminated or wt = wn and the agent receives cash.”
- Mortgage Refinancing, Consumer Spending, and Competition: Evidence from the Home Affordable Refinancing Program (2015, unknown): “32 By automatically reducing mortgage rates, ARMs may help alleviate the barriers to loan renegotiation due to securitization (Piskorski et al. 2010; Agarwal et al. 2011) and lender concerns regarding borrowers’ strategic behavior (Mayer et al. 2014).”