Consciousness without a cerebral cortex: A challenge for neuroscience and medicine

By Bjorn H. Merker. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 2007

666 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/d9b54e145f0d274e020ffd7e042e8b6b2b5d79c2

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In Cognitive Neuroscience

Citations in the corpus

Insects have the capacity for subjective experience (2016, methodology): “We rely especially on the work of Bjorn Merker (2007), who draws on evidence from anesthesia, vegetative state research, developmental disorders, brain damage and lesion studies to create a compelling argument that the integrated structures of the vertebrate midbrain are sufficient to support the ca”
Affective neuroscience of pleasure: reward in humans and animals (2008, background): “" (p. 79, Merker 2007).”
What is it like to be a person who knows nothing? Defining the active intersubjective mind of a newborn human being (2011, background): “mobility are present and active before birth, and largely sub-cortical (Merker, 2007).”
Emotion Knowledge, Emotion Utilization, and Emotion Regulation (2011, background): “Even children with encephalopathy (without a neocortex) smile in response to perception of a member of the family (Merker, 2007).”
Animal sentience and the precautionary principle (2017, neutral): “…in the brain of information from multiple sources (Dehaene 2014; Tononi and Koch 2015; Feinberg and Mallatt 2016) so as to enable its use in sophisticated forms of action-guidance, decision-making, memory and learning (Merker 2005, 2007; Ginsburg and Jablonka 2007a,b; Klein and Barron 2016).”
Emotion Theory and Research: Highlights, Unanswered Questions, and Emerging Issues (2009, neutral): “Level of cognitive development as well as top-down processes, such as attention shifting and focusing, may influence (or preclude) the registration of feeling in reflective or cognitively accessible consciousness (Buschman & Miller 2007).”
Pleasure systems in the brain (2015, background): “79) (Merker, 2007).”
1 On what it means to see , and what we can do about it (2008, positive): “It is the sparing of subcortical structures including the thalamus and the SC that supports blindsight (Stoerig and Cowey, 1997) and makes possible the persistence of a primitive kind of visual consciousness (Merker, 2007) in patients with severe cortical damage.”
Sensorimotor intentionality: The origins of intentionality in prospective agent action (2013, background): “The relationship between consciousness, affects, and sensorimotor intentionality will also take additional scholarship to elucidate further, but promises to be especially fruitful multidisciplinary work given the growing contemporary strain of phenomenology defining the experiential structures in a ”