Information distribution within firms: evidence from stock option exercises

By Steven J. Huddart, Mark H. Lang. 2001

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Rank and File Employees and the Discovery of Misreporting: The Role of Stock Options (2016, unknown): “Specifically, we assume a four-year vesting period with 25% of each year’s option grants vesting every year, and that all vested options are exercised immediately after vesting (Huddart and Lang, 2003).”
On the Timing of CEO Stock Option Awards (2005, unknown): “Further, Huddart and Lang (2003) report that option exercises by both senior and junior employees precede negative abnormal returns, suggesting that they time option exercises to occur before poor stock perfor mance, which is also consistent with value-maximizing behavior.”
What Insiders Know About Future Earnings and How They Use it: Evidence from Insider Trades (2003, background): “For example, see Jaffe (1974), Finnerty (1976), Seyhun (1986), Rozeff and Zaman (1988), Lin and Howe (1990), and Lakonishok and Lee (2001).”
Why Do Some Firms Give Stock Options To All Employees?: An Empirical Examination of Alternative Theories (2005, unknown): “See Huddart and Lang (2002) for evidence that even relatively low-level employees appear to exercise their stock options Formalizing this idea, suppose the time t = 0 market price of an option to buy one share of a firm’s stock is z0.”