Corporate Governance in Transition: Ten Empirical Findings on Shareholder Value and Industrial Relations in Germany

By Martin H pner. 2001

139 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Public Administration, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/d6d500ea71be109b33fdfc79d5ddec16f22e1d9e

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

1. Richard Deeg
2. Gregory Jackson
3. M. Höpner
4. C. Lane
5. Ruth V. Aguilera
6. Emmanuel Adegbite
7. Igor Filatotchev
8. Roberto García-Castro

In Public Administration

1. Gregory Jackson
2. Richard Deeg
3. M. Höpner
4. Anke Hassel
5. C. Lane
6. B. Amable
7. Ruth V. Aguilera
8. Abdul Rasheed

In Strategy and Management

1. Gregory Jackson
2. Richard Deeg
3. M. Höpner
4. Anke Hassel
5. C. Lane
6. Ruth V. Aguilera
7. M. Keune
8. L. Burroni

Citations in the corpus

• Changes in Corporate Governance of German Corporations: Convergence to the Anglo-American Model? (2003, background): “The studies by Hoepner (2001), Zugehoer (2001), Beyer and Hassel (2002) and Hoepner (2003b: 21) well illustrate that the shareholder value orientation is prevalent also in other industries.”
• Two Dimensions of the Internationalization of Firms (2003, background): “They have introduced international accounting methods, and stock option schemes for management, engage in share buy-back processes and co-operate with rating agencies (Höpner, 2001).”
• What Connects Industrial Relations and Corporate Governance? Explaining Institutional Complementarity (2005, background): “In the four years between 1996 and 1999 and in the 40 largest German industrial companies, top managers’ salaries increased by an average of 66 percent – plus stock options (Höpner 2001: 24–27; for the American case, see Kennedy 2001).”
• The paradox of liberalization – understanding dualism and the recovery of the German political economy (2014, unknown): “The rise of global investors and impatient 2 capital even in countries with protected corporate finance would eventually lead to higher performance expectations and an increase in shareholder value expectations in firms of coordinated market economies (Hall and Soskice, 2001; Höpner, 2001).”
• Corporate Governance in Germany: An Economic Perspective (2003, unknown): “Höpner (2001) provides data which show that the retreat of bankers from corporate boards is matched almost one to one by the arrival of former members of the management board, a trend that is particularly pronounced in the financial sector.”
• Towards a More Dynamic Theory of Capitalist Variety (2007, background): “For example, a growing literature on the ‘Anglo-Saxonization’ of German firms shows that borrowing of new ‘shareholder-value’ oriented practices involves substantial adaptation to the German context of stronger stakeholder rights and involvement (Höpner, 2001; Jackson, 2003; Boersch, 2004; Fiss and ”