Realising Redd+: National strategy and policy options

By A. Angelsen, M. Brockhaus, M. Kanninen, Erin Sills, William D. Sunderlin, S. Wertz-Kanounnikoff. 2009

531 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Performance-based payments are key, yet limited. Payments based on performance directly incentivise and compensate forest owners and users. But schemes such as payments for environmental services (PES) depend on conditions, such as secure tenure, solid carbon data and transparent governance, that are often lacking and take time to change. This constraint reinforces the need for broad institutional and policy reforms.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Global and Planetary Change

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/d431100a483537bf116f492e31862f45b237165f

Citations in the corpus

• Market Masquerades: Uncovering the Politics of Community-level Payments for Environmental Services in Cambodia (2012, unknown): “REFERENCES Agrawal, A. and A. Angelsen (2009) ‘Using Community Forest Management to Achieve REDD+ Goals’ in A. Angelsen (ed.)”
• Does community forest management provide global environmental benefits and improve local welfare (2012, unknown): “Global financial donors have invested billions of dollars in “Sustainable Forest Management” to conserve forests and the ecosystem services they provide.”
• Examining equity: a multidimensional framework for assessing equity in payments for ecosystem services (2013, unknown): “Effective ecosystem service markets are often thought to require trade-offs between equity, effectiveness (delivery of ecosystem services) and efficiency (variously net social benefit or cost-effectiveness) (Angelsen, et al., 2009; Tacconi, 2011; Wunder, 2005).”
• The political ecology of ecosystem services (2015, unknown): “At a national level, and from the point of view of national governments, there is strong interest in forests as an income source, and many governments lobbied strongly for REDD and other programs in order to bring these income streams to their country (to augment or replace logging income) and to fi”
• Hybrid estimators for mean aboveground carbon per unit area (2016, unknown): “…this sector to carbon sequestration are further reflected in three of the five carbon pools identified by the Marrakesh Accords for the maintenance of existing carbon stocks: aboveground biomass, below ground biomass, and deadwood (Angelsen et al., 2009, p. 311; Penman et al., 2013, Table 3.1.2).”
• Regime shifts limit the predictability of land-system change (2014, unknown): “REDD, if agreed upon in the international climate negotiations, requires reductions in carbon emissions to be additional, and additionality can only be ensured if reliable business-as-usual scenarios of land-use change are produced (Angelsen et al., 2009; Ghazoul et al., 2010).”
• Rights to Land, Forests and Carbon in REDD+: Insights from Mexico, Brazil and Costa Rica (2011, unknown): “Incentivizing reductions in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from deforestation and forest degradation, conserving and enhancing forest carbon stocks and sustainably managing forests (REDD+) has emerged as a key international strategy to halt land-use change in developing countries and involve them in”
• Roots of inequity: How the implementation of REDD+ reinforces past injustices (2016, unknown): “Introduction Reduced emissions from deforestation and forest degradation lus forest conservation, sustainable management of forests and nhancement of carbon stocks (REDD+) aims to cut carbon dioxde emissions from forest land, thereby mitigating climate change Angelsen and Brockhaus, 2009).”